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Decision makers throughout the international community, including the United 
States, need reliable information on the characteristics of Cuba’s next transition to make 
effective policy towards the island.  This work adds to existing research by exploring 
what lessons can be learned about Cuba’s next transition by comparing Cuba’s current 
institutional environment to the institutional environments found in four Soviet bloc 
countries prior to their transitions to democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Based 
on this institutional analysis, the study argues that a lack of internal oppositional 
organizations makes Cuba institutionally unready for a transition to democracy.  Instead, 
an imposition of an authoritarian successor regime will characterize Cuba’s next 
transition.  Moreover, Cuba’s eventual transition to democracy likely will occur through 
imposition, but as the distance in time from the departure of Fidel Castro increases, a 
transition towards democracy through reform or, less likely, through revolution becomes 
more probable.  Finally, this work recommends that international decision makers tailor 
their policies towards Cuba in such a manner as to avoid a violent revolution on the 
island, to promote an independent Cuban civil society, and to seek an international 
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This study examines what can be learned about Cuba’s next transition from a 
comparison of political institutions in Cuba with those in Soviet bloc countries that made 
their transitions towards democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The primary 
assumption of this work is that political institutions matter in shaping the nature of 
regime transitions.  Chapter I provides an introduction to the key elements of the study, 
including its theoretical foundation, its case study methodology, and its preliminary 
argument. 
Chapter II explores Karl and Schmitter’s framework for describing different 
modes of transitions and finds that a general consensus among scholars supports this 
assumption even though many of these authors dispute the specifics of political 
transitions.  While this work does not proclaim Karl and Schmitter’s framework to be the 
only applicable guide to analysis, it uses the framework throughout the study because it 
provides a straightforward method for choosing and analyzing the case studies and 
because it allows a simple, visual portrayal of the interaction of political institutions 
during different modes of transition. 
This work then continues by analyzing four case studies of Soviet bloc transitions 
towards democracy in Chapter III.  Chapter III looks specifically at four countries that 
represented four different modes of transitions.  Hungary provides the closest example of 
a pacted transition while Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria conform respectively to the 
reform, revolution, and imposition modes of transition.  In reassessing Karl and 
Schmitter’s analysis of these countries’ modes of transition, this work generally affirms 
the authors’ location of the Soviet bloc transitions in terms of both the elite and mass-
based institutions and the strategies of force and compromise.  However, this study adds a 
third axis to Karl and Schmitter’s diagram.  This z-axis expands the ability of the 
framework to portray the complete spectrum of political institutions involved in 
transitions by showing the relative importance of internal and external institutions in the 
 xv
case study transitions.  In this manner, Chapter III provides the case studies against which 
to compare the Cuban case. 
In a pattern similar to that of Chapter III, Chapter IV explores the current state of 
Cuba’s elite, mass-based, and external institutions.  Clearly, Cuba’s communist elite 
institutions hold the greatest institutional strength among its internal institutions.  A 
nuclear communist elite centered on Castro and an increasingly politically-involved 
military form the cornerstones of the communist regime.  Elite and mass-based 
opposition remains weak and fragmented in Cuba.  The most powerful of such 
institutions are the religious ones, and they serve more as an inconvenience to the 
communists than as a source of strong opposition to them.  Chapter IV also compares 
Cuba’s current institutional environment to the institutional environments in the Soviet 
bloc case studies during the most crucial phases of their transitions.  Even though Cuba’s 
institutional environment does not exactly mirror any of those found in the case studies, it 
most strongly resembles those in Romania and Bulgaria. 
Building on this institutional comparison, Chapter V draws out the implications 
for Cuba’s next transition.  It looks not only at the similarities between Cuba and the case 
studies but also at the differences among them.  In this way, it seeks to determine the 
mode of Cuba’s next transition.  Chapter V proposes three hypotheses about Cuba’s 
political future.  First, it argues that internal institutions will matter most in Cuba’s next 
transition because the necessary external conditions for a transition toward democracy in 
Cuba already exist.  Second, it places Cuba’s next mode of transition firmly in the 
imposition mode and contends that an installation of a communist successor, not a move 
towards democracy, will characterize this imposition.  Finally, it argues that Cuba’s 
eventual transition to democracy most likely will occur in the imposition mode of 
transition but that as the distance in time from Castro’s departure increases, so does the 
likelihood that its transitional mode will move towards the reform or, less likely, the 
revolution categories.  Ultimately, Chapter V proposes that Cuba is not yet institutionally 
ready for a transition to democracy because it lacks oppositional institutions strong 
enough to challenge the communist regime. 
 xvi
As the concluding chapter, Chapter VI begins with a review of the major 
arguments and findings contained throughout the study.  Next, it offers three tenets that 
should guide decision makers in the international community, including the United 
States, in formulating policy on Cuba.  First, it recommends that policy makers should 
tailor their efforts to avoid a transition to democracy in Cuba through violent revolution.  
Instead, they should support a transition through imposition or reform.  Second, it argues 
for the promotion of an independent Cuban civil society as a method to avoid a 
revolution and promote a democratic transition through imposition or reform.  Third, it 
advises members of the international community, including states, non-governmental 
organizations, and inter-governmental organizations, to seek a consensus on Cuba’s 
future in order to make the influence of these external institutions more effective in 
promoting democratization on the island.  Finally, Chapter VI recognizes the necessity of 
continued research on Cuba’s institutional environment to ensure that policy makers have 
the most current information on how these institutions shape Cuba’s political 
environment and vice versa.  Only with such sustained vigilance in analysis can an 
































Today, Cuba approaches a looming political transition due, at least, to the aging 
of Fidel Castro.  Despite the inevitability of a change, the type and direction of Cuba's 
next transition remain uncertain.  Within this climate of ambiguity, the international 
community, including the United States, cannot easily prepare for the effects of the 
transition.  To do so, these governments need to assess what type of change is most likely 
in Cuba.  This work addresses this problem of predicting the characteristics of the next 
Cuban transition.   
Although many scholarly and government studies have hypothesized about the 
nature of the post-Castro government in Cuba, this work addresses the issue through a 
comparison of the institutional environment in Cuba today with the institutional 
environments in several Soviet bloc nations prior to their transitions to democracy.  
Ultimately, this work proposes that an institutional comparison between Cuba and these 
Soviet bloc countries can aid in determining the characteristics of the next political 
transition in Cuba. 
A. IMPORTANCE 
Studying Cuba’s coming transition is especially important today as “intermestic” 
issues increasingly dominate the political environment.  The connectivity between 
international and domestic concerns has increased with the phenomenon of globalization.  
In the case of Cuba, the importance of Cuban-American lobbying groups on United 
States’ policies toward the island demonstrates the reality of this complex environment.  
If liberalization or democratization accompanies the next transition in Cuba, the United 
States and the international community may be bombarded with many of these 
intermestic issues related to Cuba.  For example, potential problems may involve divisive 
issues, such as refugee flows, land ownership disputes, and business quarrels, to name 
only a few.  The United States and the larger international community must be prepared 
to deal with such transitional issues.  They will be unable to do so without a fairly 
accurate assessment of what the next Cuban transition will look like.  This work adds to 
1 
previous insights by exploring the implications of institutional similarities or 
dissimilarities between Cuba and several Soviet bloc states. 
B. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
This work focuses on the importance of institutions in affecting political 
transitions and pursues an institutional analysis and argument.  While it does not refute 
the effects of culture and behavior on political environments, it stresses the importance of 
the organizations that transcend nationalities and permeate all political environments.  
Recognizing the growing influence of international actors on transitions, this study looks 
at both domestic and international institutions.  Important domestic institutions include, 
but are not limited to, the following: political parties, government bureaucracies, civil-
society organizations, and the political elite.  Likewise, relevant international institutions 
include, but are not limited to, the following: other states, intergovernmental 
organizations, and non-governmental organizations.  This work focuses on these 
institutions and their interactions with each other in influencing the transitional 
environment.  This forms the basis for the theoretical approach. 
C. METHODOLOGY  
A clarification of this work’s methodology enables one to better understand its 
approach.  Certainly, the complexity inherent in determining the characteristics of the 
next transition in Cuba could demand a ceaseless exploration.  The common problem of a 
few cases and many variables applies to this study.  In order to minimize the analytical 
complexity of this study, this work uses a case study approach.  The case study approach 
simplifies the analysis by examining countries in the former Soviet bloc that have 
previously undergone a transition away from communism.  Despite the differences 
among the Soviet bloc states, their commonality of communism reduces the number of 
variables and provides the closest extant cases to apply to a comparison with Cuba, the 
sole remnant Soviet-style communist state. 
To further hone the focus of this study, this work uses the model developed by 
Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe C. Schmitter (1991) in their article, “Modes of Transition 
in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe.”  Karl and Schmitter propose a 
framework of transition classification based on the influence of political actors and their 
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strategies.  From a theoretical perspective using various combinations of elites, masses, 
compromise, and force, four types of transitions to democracy appear.  These four are as 
follows: pacts, reforms, revolutions, and impositions. 
Using Karl and Schmitter’s framework as a model for choosing the four case 
studies, this work focuses on the transitions in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria.  
While most authors agree that Poland and Bulgaria clearly conform respectively to the 
reform and imposition models, the cases of Hungary and Romania are not as easily 
placed in any one category.  Despite the heavy influence of imposition, Hungary does 
show some elements of a “pacted” transition.  Similarly, while imposition also affected 
its transition, Romania is close to the revolutionary model.  (Karl and Schmitter, 1991) 
Thus, these four states, showing elements of the four possible transition models, provide 
the case study material for this work. 
Some initial hypotheses concerning the case studies help to clarify the intent of 
using a case study methodology.  If, as Karl and Schmitter assert, the four Soviet bloc 
countries do indeed represent different types of transitions, different combinations of 
causal institutional factors should characterize each case study.  Based on this 
assumption, one can hypothesize as to the relative importance of different institutions in 
each given transition.  As the closest example of a pacted transition, Hungary’s transition 
should reflect a compromise among elite actors, such as communist officials, 
bureaucratic leaders, or political party figureheads.  Poland’s transition, as the model of a 
reform-based transition, should demonstrate a compromise inclusive of the masses, such 
as civil-society organizations or broad-based political party movements.  In the case of 
Romania, the closest model to a transition by revolution, one should expect to see the use 
of force by the masses, such as the aforementioned mass-based groups.  For Bulgaria, the 
example of imposition, the use of force by elites, including the previously-mentioned 
elite domestic institutions or external institutions, should be dominant.  Based on these 
initial hypotheses, with the possible exception of the imposition model, one should expect 
external institutions, such as other states or inter- and non-governmental organizations, to 
be limited to supportive, not dominant, roles in the transitions.  In general, these initial 
hypotheses further illuminate the institutional actors whose presence or absence in any 
3 
given transition will confirm or challenge the categorizations made by Karl and 
Schmitter.  
D. PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT 
Although several scholars expected a transition in Cuba to follow closely behind 
those of the Soviet bloc countries, such a regime change did not occur.  Cuba, despite its 
economic problems, has not succumbed to the Third Wave of democratization yet.  
Although it has changed many of its policies in an attempt to adapt to the post-Cold War 
realities, Cuba appears to have retained most of the fundamental political aspects of its 
communist system.  That Cuba has been largely immune to external pressures for change 
suggests that the island’s political continuity rests on its internal environment and 
institutions.  This work argues that the internal institutional environments responsible for 
transitions toward democracy in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria are generally 
absent in Cuba and that the lack of this necessary political climate indicates that Cuba’s 
next transition is not likely to be towards democracy.  If this preliminary argument holds 
true, the focus of the international community, including the United States, should be 
more on strengthening democracy-promoting institutions within Cuba than on attempting 
to weaken the communist regime through direct external pressure. 
E. FORMAT 
 This work presents the institutional implications for Cuba’s next transition 
through the use of a simple, logical format.  Chapter II explains Karl and Schmitter’s 
theoretical perspective in greater detail, setting the stage for the case studies, which 
appear in Chapter III.  Chapter III focuses on the transitions in Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Bulgaria.  Even though it describes the transitions in terms of Karl and 
Schmitter’s framework, it references several authors and includes different interpretations 
of the transitional events.   
Chapter IV analyses Cuba's current institutional environment and highlights the 
similarities and dissimilarities evident between Cuba and the Soviet bloc case studies.  It 
seeks to determine the degree to which Cuba’s political environment looks similar to 
those in the Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria prior to their transitions.  Once 
4 
again, the analysis of the institutional environment affecting Cuba draws upon the 
opinions and research of several prominent authors. 
Chapter V explores the implications for the next transition in Cuba based on the 
findings in Chapter IV.  The goal is not necessarily to match the current political 
environment in Cuba to one of the aforementioned Soviet bloc countries.  Even though 
any similarities should not be ignored, the absence of such congruities does not condemn 
this work to futility.  On the contrary, the absence of key pro-democracy transitional 
political institutions in the Cuban environment would suggest that Cuba’s next transition 
will not be towards democracy.  This would be just as significant a discovery as the 
identification of Cuba with one of the pact, reform, revolution, or imposition models.  
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the arguments and provides limited policy 
recommendations.  Overall, the intent of the format is to provide a logical assessment of 
the characteristics that will most likely define Cuba’s next political transition.  
Establishing a clear background on the possible forms and case studies of transitions 
provides the necessary information with which to analyze and assess the institutions in 
Cuba’s political environment and their potential influence on the coming transition. 
F. FINAL REMARKS 
Ultimately, this work seeks to add to the current research on the characteristics of 
Cuba’s next political transition.  At times, authors have argued both that Cuba is on the 
verge of democracy and that Cuba is condemned to an undemocratic near-term future.  
The dichotomous nature of these predictions leaves little room for novel statements on 
future regime change on the island.  Even so, the institutional approach taken by this 
work can add additional supportive or contradictory information to either of these 
aforementioned viewpoints.  By comparing the institutional environment in Cuba today 
to that in former Soviet bloc nations prior to their democratic transitions, one can make 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
6 
II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON REGIME TRANSITION 
 
 
As noted in Chapter I, a specific theoretical perspective provides a model from 
which to choose the case studies examined in Chapter III.  The framework used herein is 
one proposed by Karl and Schmitter (1991).  It serves not only as a reference point for the 
case studies but also as a transitional theory against which other scholars' ideas about 
transition dynamics can be compared and contrasted.  As such, Karl and Schmitter's 
framework is the basic model used in the analyses throughout this work. 
This chapter explains the transitional framework in greater detail and reveals 
where Karl and Schmitter think Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria belong within 
that model.  Furthermore, it compares and contrasts their ideas about transitions from 
authoritarianism to democracy with those from other authors.  Overall, this chapter 
elaborates on the framework that will be used to analyze the case studies in the following 
chapter. 
A. EXPLAINING THE FRAMEWORK 
Karl and Schmitter explain their transitional framework in the article, “Modes of 
Transition in Latin America, Southern, and Eastern Europe” (1991).  In setting up their 
study, they make several assumptions, some of which need to be mentioned here.  For 
example, Karl and Schmitter assume that the various transitional paths away from 
authoritarianism can be clustered into a few different “modes of transition.”  Moreover, 
the presence of a certain type of mode of transition influences the type of subsequent 
democracy.  (Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 269)  From the latter assumption, one can 
further deduce that a transition away from authoritarianism will not always be a transition 
towards consolidated democracy.  Moreover, an absence of any of the given modes of 
transition suggests that the transition will not be towards even an illiberal democracy.  
Thus, while some authoritarian governments transition towards democracy, some merely 
transition to some form of non-democracy. 
7 
With these assumptions, Karl and Schmitter propose four basic modes of 
transition -- pacts, reforms, revolutions, and impositions.  Figure 1 shows a visual 
representation of how each of these modes of transition reflects varying degrees of elite 
or mass influence as well as different proportions of compromise or force.  (Karl and 
Schmitter, 1991, p. 275)  Importantly, the authors note, “Transitions are 'produced' by 
actors who choose strategies that lead to change from one kind of regime to another” 
(Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 274).  In other words, certain political institutions have the 
ability to affect the outcome of regime transitions. 
 
Figure 1. Modes of Transition 
From Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 275 
Without identifying every applicable institution, Karl and Schmitter do provide 
some basic guidance on what types of institutions are most important for certain modes of 
transition.  The division of Figure 1's vertical axis into “Elites” and “Masses” suggests a 
spectrum of political institutions ranging from the communist leadership at the upper 
8 
extremity to the citizenry at the lower extremity.  In between falls a wide range of 
institutions, such as government bureaucracies, political parties, non-governmental 
organizations, and civil society groups.  As Figure 1 proposes, each of these institutions 
can act either singly or in concert with other institutions to produce a regime transition.  
The specific combination of institutional actors and strategies determines the mode of 
transition taken. 
In addition to Figure 1, Karl and Schmitter provide a verbal description of the 
modes of transition.  A pacted transition occurs when “elites agree among themselves” to 
move away from authoritarianism.  A mobilization of the masses from below that forces 
a compromised outcome absent of violence characterizes a reform.  A revolution happens 
when the “masses rise up in arms and defeat the previous authoritarian rulers militarily.”  
Finally, elite use of force to create a transition amidst opposition by incumbents denotes 
an imposition.  (Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 275)  The definitions, while leaving 
substantial room for interpretation and variation, define the types of transitions one 
should expect for each mode. 
Even with these definitions, a large area in Figure 1, denoted by the cross-shaped 
interior, remains outside of any of the given modes of transition.  Karl and Schmitter 
classify this area as one in which “both the identity of the relevant actors and the 
selection of strategies are ‘mixed’” (1991, p. 275).  In other words, this is the gray area of 
the diagram in which any number of combinations of institutions and methods can 
characterize the shift away from authoritarianism.  Karl and Schmitter propose that 
external actors may have the most transitional influence in this area (1991, p. 275).  
Political institutions, such as other states, inter-governmental organizations, and foreign 
non-governmental organizations, may have their greatest effects on countries whose 
transitions fall in this ambiguous center space. 
Based on the post-transition outcomes in the countries on which Karl and 
Schmitter focus in their study, they rank the modes of transition according to the 
likelihood that they will produce a democracy.  They suggest that pacted transitions are 
most likely to lead to democracy, followed by impositions.  However, they note that pacts 
and impositions often create restricted democracies that do not enjoy full political 
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liberties.  Transitions by reform and revolution appear even less likely to produce 
democracy, with mixed modes of transitions producing the least favorable conditions on 
which to create a democratic transition.  (1991, p. 282)  Chapter V returns to this issue of 
transitional success as it attempts to locate where Cuba's institutional environment will 
place it on Figure 1 and what its location means for the next transition on the island. 
In summary, different institutions and strategies determine whether a given 
transition away from authoritarianism should be characterized as a pact, reform, 
revolution, or imposition.  As a visual depiction of these ideas, Figure 1 provides the 
basic model that will be used for analytical purposes both in the remainder of this chapter 
and in the rest of this study. 
B. LOCATING THE SOVIET BLOC TRANSITIONS IN SPECIFIC MODES 
OF TRANSITION 
Reviewing Karl and Schmitter’s location of the Soviet bloc transitions within the 
framework established by Figure 1 provides an initial reference point from which to 
assess the case studies used in this work.  This section establishes the baseline 
classification of the transitions in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria as a 
foundation for comparison in the following chapter.   
Karl and Schmitter’s modal location of the case studies used in this study appears 
in Figure 2.  Each of the case study countries falls within or near one of the four modes of 
transition.  Karl and Schmitter clearly characterize Poland's transition as reform-based, 
and Bulgaria's transition falls easily within the imposition mode.  While the transitions of 
Hungary and Romania fall in the mixed area, they are the closest examples, respectively 
of the pacted and revolutionary modes of transition.  (1991, pp. 276-7)  Figure 2 reflects 
these classifications and also shows the locations of the modes of transitions of the Soviet 
bloc countries not used in this work. 
Providing additional insight into the location of each of the case studies’ modes of 
transition, Karl and Schmitter elaborate on their placement.  In the case of Poland, the 
authors argue that its transition should be categorized as reform-based because it started 
and ended in that mode and involved mass-based movements throughout its life.  
Although a pact and an anti-reform military imposition followed the initial reforms, 
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additional pressure from the masses led to a second pact that increased the opportunity 
for more mass involvement and further reforms.  Although Poland's transition actually 
involved several transitional modes, Karl and Schmitter ultimately firmly locate it within 
the reform mode.  (1991, pp. 276-7) 
 
Figure 2. Modes of Transition of Soviet Bloc Countries 
After Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 276 
Similarly, the remaining three case study countries experience forces from 
multiple modes of transition.  Karl and Schmitter describe Bulgaria's transition as being 
initialed characterized by violent mass-based mobilization but ultimately driven by the 
ruling elites (1991, p. 277).  This explanation justifies the placement of Bulgaria in the 
lower half of the imposition box, closer to the revolution mode. 
Hungary's transitional location is the furthest way from the mode for which it is 
being used in this work to typify.  Even so, it is the closest Soviet bloc country to the 
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pacted mode.  Karl and Schmitter note that Hungary's transition began as an imposition 
by the dominant party but eventually incorporated elites from opposition groups while the 
masses remained alienated from either process (1991, p. 277).  This latter trend, in which 
elite institutional control became more multilateral, explains why Hungary's transition 
shows at least some elements of a classic pacted transition. 
Romania's transitional location, while not directly in its respective modal area, is 
relatively close to the revolution category.  Indeed, as Karl and Schmitter point out, a 
violent mass-based movement characterized the initial stages of the Romanian transition.  
However, they add that the later involvement of the Soviet Union, the elite, and the 
military drove the process towards the imposition mode (1991, p. 277).  Even so, 
Romania's transition serves as a useful example of a transition heavily influenced by 
revolution.  
Interestingly, with the exception of Romania, the Soviet bloc transitions roughly 
lie along a line from the reform mode corner of Figure 2 to the imposition mode corner.  
This may suggest that the institutions needed for a pacted transition or a revolution are 
largely absent within these types of communist states.  The lack of an organized elite 
opposition to participate in a pact and the lack of civil society organizations capable of 
mobilizing mass revolts appear to characterize these transitions.  Chapter IV returns to 
this observation and seeks to determine whether or not Cuba’s institutional environment 
will place it along the same general line. 
C. ALTERNATE VIEWPOINTS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF 
INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITIONS 
1. Linz and Stepan: Post-Totalitarianism 
Linz and Stepan offer some additional insights on the importance of institutions in 
political transitions in Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.  First, 
these authors describe Soviet-type regimes as post-totalitarian, as opposed to totalitarian 
or authoritarian.  Post-totalitarian states allow for more institutions than totalitarian ones.  
In fact, a “parallel culture” may develop in these states that, although not interacting with 
the state, plays host to institutional pluralism.  (1996, pp. 41-3)  Furthermore, “[t]his 
growing pluralism is simultaneously a dynamic source of vulnerability for the post-
totalitarian regime and a dynamic source of strength for an emerging democratic 
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opposition” (1996, p. 43).  Interestingly, as Figure 2 shows, the majority of the Soviet-
bloc transitions appear to be closer to the mass side of the vertical axis than to the elite 
side.  This may suggest that institutional pluralism often plays an important role in 
forcing a transition away from communism. 
Despite the favorable nature of the institutional environment in post-totalitarian 
states, one must be careful not to assume that the state is abandoning control.  In fact, the 
state and its party still dominate the political forum, and expansions of other institutions 
should not be mistaken for political pluralism (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 46).  
Nevertheless, “[t]he pluralism of the parallel culture…should be seen as social pluralism 
that may have political implications” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 46).  In spite of its 
dominance, the post-totalitarian state demonstrates some unique weaknesses.  Often 
lacking regular rejuvenation of the political leadership, these regimes become brittle as 
time passes.  (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 47-8)  “Such a leadership structure, if it is not 
able to repress opponents in a crisis, is particularly vulnerable to collapse” (Linz and 
Stepan, 1996, p. 48).  As the ideological commitment of the post-totalitarian leadership 
wanes, it becomes less able to mobilize popular support and relies increasingly on 
performance criteria as its basis of legitimacy (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 48-50).  These 
factors combine to make mature post-totalitarian regimes institutionally weak, allowing 
non-state institutions to move into the political arena during crises. 
Overall, Linz and Stepan's views generally support those of Karl and Schmitter.  
Both groups of authors highlight the importance of institutions and agree on the 
dominance of elite institutions in Soviet-style regimes.  However, Linz and Stepan argue 
that mass-based institutions become politically active only in crisis situations.  Prior to a 
crisis, the state successfully prohibits unofficial institutions from becoming part of the 
political landscape.  Once these institutions become politically active during a crisis, 
though, they may find it relatively to easy to force a political transition. 
2. Ekiert and O’Neil: Transitions from Authoritarianism 
Another set of authors provides additional insight into the importance of 
institutions during transitions.  In separate articles, Grzegorz Ekiert and Patrick O’Neil 
analyze the importance of political institutions in creating regime change in Soviet bloc 
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states.  Although these authors classify the Soviet-type states as authoritarian, they refer 
to the same basic governments as Linz and Stepan. 
Ekiert’s discussion of transitions from authoritarianism focuses on both 
institutional and structural catalysts.  He asserts that the following preconditions 
characterized that collapse of all of the Soviet bloc states: sudden deterioration of old 
political institutions, continued economic decline, emergence of a second economy, 
relaxation of Cold War geopolitical constraints, and development of opposition 
movements that could affect the regime (Ekiert, 1991, p. 286-7).   
Furthermore, he reviews the scholarly opinions of the past fifty years concerning 
the prospects transitions to democracy in the Soviet bloc.  During the 1950s, many 
experts saw residual nationalism as a mechanism through which Central Europe could rid 
itself of communism.  However, when a middle ground nationalist-socialist dogma arose 
after the Soviet crackdowns in Hungary and Poland, many authors abandoned the 
argument that differing ideologies would force transitions in the Soviet bloc.  (Ekiert, 
1991, pp. 290-1) 
A structural-functionalist argument replaced the ideological theory by the mid-
1960s.  Supporters of this approach assumed that structural changes in the economy 
would produce political changes.  This cause-and-effect relationship “allowed scholars to 
predict evolutionary, linear changes” as well as “an optimistic scenario of progressive 
and inevitable liberalization and a likely transition towards democracy.”  (Ekiert, 1991, p. 
292) 
When economic stagnation occurred in the 1970s without creating transitional 
pressures, scholars looked for yet another explanation.  They offered a corporatist 
argument in which the communist regime would systematically co-opt opposition 
elements into its regime without making significant concessions.  This proposal 
eliminated the potential for a transition to democracy; the socialist systems might change, 
but they would not disappear.  (Ekiert, 1991, pp. 293-5) 
However, when the largely independent Solidarity movement emerged in Poland, 
the corporatist theory came under attack.  While some authors turned to a class-based 
argument, others began to recognize the importance of civil society, political society, and 
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the state.  The latter insight became the basis for the institutional approach.  (Ekiert, 
1991, pp. 295-300)  “This distinction between domestic society, political society and the 
state allows us not only to account for the various dimensions of the relations between the 
state and society overlooked by past approaches, but also to identify new socio-political 
changes and processes in the region which shaped patterns of collapse in state-socialist 
regimes and to discern the contours of the current transition process” (Ekiert, 1991, p. 
300).  Thus, Ekiert’s analysis and literature review lends support to the importance of 
political institutions in shaping transitions away from authoritarianism. 
O’Neil also supports the argument that institutions play important roles in 
influencing the nature of political transitions.  His emphasis on institutions as the major 
determining factor in transitions “start[s] from a rejection of the individual-based market 
analogies of the rational choice, pluralist, or behavioralist approaches” (O’Neil, 1996, p. 
581).  Instead of utilitarian creations, institutions develop independently and propagate 
their own particular norms, values, and patterns.  This gives institutions the “ability to 
create and shape the objectives of individual and collective action.”  (O’Neil, 1996, p. 
581)   
As mechanisms that solidify and limit long-term flexibility, institutions often have 
lengthy lives terminated by an abrupt sequence of events that overwhelms their ability to 
adapt to new realities (O’Neil, 1996, p. 582).  “Institutionalization can thus be seen as a 
basic tactic for organizational survival, though one that over time often generates its own 
set of dangers” (O’Neil, 1996, p. 584).  O’Neil suggests that this type of 
institutionalization, which characterized state socialism in the Soviet bloc, contributed to 
the sudden collapse of communist regimes in Central Europe (1996, pp. 585-7).  
Ultimately, “[i]nstitutional orders determine the context that shapes not only the 
transition itself but also the subsequent political order, that is, how authoritarianism dies 
and what replaces it” (O’Neil, 1996, p. 579).  This premise mirrors the basic ideas held 
by Karl and Schmitter, and it provides an underlying assumption for this work -- that 
different combinations of institutions lead to different transitional outcomes. 
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3. Bunce: Interregional Comparisons of Transitions 
Valerie Bunce offers additional insights into the importance of institutions in 
transitions, and she responds negatively to Karl and Schmitter’s assertion that comparing 
transitions between regions is a valid pursuit.   
To begin, Bunce does not contest the value of institutional analysis in the study of 
transitions.  She perceives institutions as important players during regime changes and 
recognizes that the power, organizational structure, and interests of different institutions 
affect political transitions.  In addition, she lumps the remaining possible transitional 
influences in a category called “opportunities.”  She argues that opportunities, such as 
economic decline and political opening, often spark institutional change.  In the case of 
Central Europe, both the institutions and the opportunities grew in such a manner as to 
promote political transitions.  (Bunce, 1999, pp. 17-9) 
However, Bunce attacks Karl and Schmitter’s argument that transitions in the 
Soviet bloc can be compared to transitions in other regions, specifically Southern Europe 
and Latin America.  She suggests that Karl and Schmitter’s work does not validate their 
rationale for such comparison (Bunce, 1995a, 118).  For example, Karl and Schmitter fail 
to include some transitions away from authoritarianism in their study and fail to offer 
reasons for the omission of such cases (Bunce, 1995a, 113).  Bunce implies that Karl and 
Schmitter do not include all extant cases because all of the cases do not support their 
argument. 
Specifically, Bunce finds several faults in interregional comparisons of 
transitions.  First, Soviet bloc authoritarianism was longer and more entrenched than that 
of Southern Europe and Latin America.  Second, relative institutional strengths varied in 
these regions.  In the former, the military abstained from significant political involvement 
while in the latter it became politically active.  Similarly, the Soviet bloc lacked the 
substantial middle class and civil society found in Southern Europe and Latin America.  
Third, transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America occurred within a stable 
international context while those of the Soviet bloc took place in the course of decay of a 
superpower.  (1995b, pp. 88-9, 93-4)  Bunce argues that these differences created 
different, incomparable types of transitions (1995b, p. 95).  In the Soviet bloc, both the 
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state and the economic system needed total replacement, but in Southern Europe and 
Latin America the regime and existing institutions needed only modifications (Bunce, 
1995b, pp. 91-2). 
This work neither challenges Bunce’s assertions nor intends to attack Karl and 
Schmitter’s use of interregional comparison; such discussion is outside of the scope of 
this study.  Nevertheless, Bunce’s argument supports the comparison of the institutional 
environment in Cuba with those in the pre-transition Soviet bloc states.  Although Bunce 
does not focus on Cuba because the island has not yet experienced a transition towards 
democracy, the institutional similarities between Cuba and the Soviet bloc states are 
many.  Cuba does not conform to the typical image of a capitalist, authoritarian regime in 
Latin American or Southern Europe.  On the contrary, Cuba faces many problems similar 
to those confronted by the countries of Central Europe.  Cuba lacks a strong civil society, 
has no recent history of democratic rule, and continues to operate a failing socialist 
economy.  In terms of Bunce’s argument, the primary difference between Cuba and the 
Soviet bloc states is that the former’s transition is likely to occur in a relatively more-
stable international context.  Ultimately, despite Bunce’s rejection of interregional 
comparisons, her arguments do support a transitional and institutional analysis between 
Cuba and the members of the Soviet bloc. 
Overall, Linz and Stepan, Ekiert and O’Neil, and Bunce offer opinions that 
support those of Karl and Schmitter to varying degrees.  Although these authors use some 
different terminology, have minor disagreements on when certain institutions become 
politically influential, and do not agree on the applicability of interregional comparisons 
of transitions, all concede that institutions matter.  The remainder of this work builds on 
Karl and Schmitter’s framework, working with the assumption voiced by all of these 
authors that institutions play an important role in shaping the political environment and 
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III. THE CASE STUDIES 
 
 
Having established an understanding of regime transitions, this work now 
proceeds with the first major goal of analyzing the four transitional case studies by 
examining the importance of the various institutions in each case and reassessing the 
appropriate mode of transition for each.  As noted above, the four transitional case studies 
are the transitions from communism to democracy in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and 
Bulgaria during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
This section consists of four parts, one for each case study.  Within each case 
study first appears a brief description of the transitional events.  An analysis of the 
political institutions involved in the transition follows.  The discussions of political 
institutions include the following three broad classifications: elite institutions, mass-based 
institutions, and external institutions.  Finally, each part reassesses Karl and Schmitter's 
placement of the case study in its appropriate mode of transition (see Figures 1 and 2). 
The goal of this section is to develop an understanding of the different types of 
democratic transitions in Soviet bloc states and of the role of political institutions in 
propagating these changes.  By analyzing a wide variety of transitions, this section seeks 
to uncover all the basic modes of transition available to Soviet-style communist regimes.  
Ultimately, the information from this section provides the basis for a comparison of the 
institutional environments in pre-transition Soviet bloc states with the current Cuban 
institutional landscape in order to aid in determining what direction Cuba's next transition 
will take. 
A. HUNGARY 
 According to Karl and Schmitter (1991, p. 276-7), Hungary provides the best 
example of a pacted transition from among the Soviet bloc states.  This section provides a 
brief description of the transition, an analysis of the importance of different political 
institutions in Hungary's transition, and an assessment of Hungary's mode of transition.  
Although the political institutions involved in Hungary's transition spanned the full 
spectrum of actors, this section argues that Karl and Schmitter's location of Hungary's 
mode of transition is generally valid. 
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1. Transition: 1985-1990 
Even though the most decisive aspects of Hungary's transition occurred in 1989, 
important precursor and background events in its transition took place from the mid-
1980s until 1990.  As the first secretary of the Hungarian communist party, János Kádár 
was Hungary's political leader at the beginning of this period.  Responding to the 1956 
revolution, Kádár had established a regime based, in part, on amelioration.  Nevertheless, 
the communist party solidly controlled Hungary's political environment through the mid-
1980s.  Kádár did promote economic liberalization during this period, most notably in the 
form of the New Economic Mechanism (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 204-5, 239-
40).  However, his reforms could not avert a general economic stagnation (Körösényi, 
1992, p. 1). 
By 1985, dissatisfaction with the economic model had appeared among elite and 
mass-based elements, and pressure for reforms was growing.  Even so, the majority of the 
influential political dialogue continued to take place within the official Hungarian 
Socialist Workers' Party.  This communist party played host to a growing schism between 
the hardliners, concentrated around Kádár, and the reformers, led by Imre Pozsgay.  As 
tensions within the communist party grew, the first opposition movement, the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum, emerged in late 1987 and began to mobilize popular sentiment 
against the ruling regime in mass-based meetings.  (Körösényi, 1992, pp. 2-4) 
Amidst this environment, the first significant political change occurred in May 
1988 when the communists replaced Kádár with Károly Grósz, another party hardliner.  
The new secretary recognized that the Hungarian economy needed attention, but he did 
not intend to promote any political reforms.  Unable to synthesize these competing 
demands, Grósz appeared indecisive.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp 240-2) 
As Grósz did nothing, political dissension grew.  The governmental response 
appeared mixed.  On one hand, police dispersed a number of popular, anti-government 
demonstrations during the latter half of 1988.  On the other hand, censorship evaporated 
by the end of the year, and the Hungarian opposition movement finally enjoyed freedom 
of the press.  (Körösényi, 1992, pp. 5-6) 
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Throughout 1988, the number of political parties grew.  While these opposition 
groups pressed for open elections and a new constitution, the communist party hoped to 
contain the situation within the one-party system.  Hardliners and reformers shared a 
consensus on the need to keep demands for participation and change within the 
traditional system and spoke of promoting “socialist pluralism” or “democratic 
socialism” in which the party would remain the ultimate arbiter.  Although mass-based 
demonstrations also occurred in response to the government's decision to dam the 
Danube River, at the end of 1988 the opposition still was not directing the political 
changes in Hungary. (Körösényi, 1992, p. 6) 
In the summer of 1989, Hungarians succeeded in reburying Imre Nagy, a hero of 
the 1956 revolution, in a national honorary cemetery in Budapest (Rothschild and 
Wingfield, 2000, p. 242).  The reaffirmation of the revolution received support from 
statements issued by Pozsgay (Körösényi, 1992, p. 7) and by his attendance at the 
ceremony (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 242).  This symbolic event represented a 
shift in favor of the reformist elements of the communist party (Körösényi, 1992, p. 7). 
Later in the summer, elements of the opposition and the communist leadership 
met in round-table negotiations to discuss a transfer of power.  However, due both to 
divisions between the hardliners and reformers and to the unconsolidated nature of the 
opposition, these talks stalled.  Meanwhile, reforms continued.  Strikes became legal, and 
the communists agreed to a transition to a market economy.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 
2000, p. 243)  Eventually, the two sides, with the exception of the radical opposition, 
agreed on a Great Pact in late September (Körösényi, 1992, p. 8). 
The final blows to the communist party came in October 1989.  In a party 
congress that month, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party reorganized as the 
Hungarian Socialist Party, and communist movement effectively collapsed (Körösényi, 
1992, pp. 8-9).  The country was renamed the Republic of Hungary later in the month 
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 243).  Although the government leaders remained 
unchanged, their power had evaporated.  Communist rule ultimately ended in March and 
April of 1990 when opposition parties won the majority of votes in the parliamentary 
elections.  (Körösényi, 1992, p. 9-10) 
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2. Political Institutions  
a. Elite Institutions 
Elite institutions compose the first category to consider when determining 
the influence of political institutions on the transition in Hungary.  Examples of elite 
institutions that may contribute to any given country’s transition include the following: 
elite-based political parties, government bureaucracy, and independent political elites.  
This section examines the role of each in Hungary’s transition. 
Political parties clearly played an important role in Hungary’s transition.  
The leaders of these parties influenced events and shaped outcomes throughout the 
transition process.  The traditional communist party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ 
Party, and the multitude of new opposition parties formed the landscape of political 
parties.  Through the mid-1980s, the communist party dominated the political scene, and 
its historical legacy of control meant that it would be an important actor in the transition.  
Indeed, tensions within the party between the hardliners and reformers played a 
significant role in creating the space for other opposition parties to emerge.   
As László Lengyel suggests, “Even though [the communist hardliners] are 
standing in the corner, they still have considerable economic, political and military 
weight, perhaps the greatest in the party and the country” (1992, p. 30).  The hardliners 
became largely incapacitated when the indecisive Grósz replaced Kádár.  The inaction on 
the part of the hardliners appears to have given the party reformers an opportunity to 
promote their socialist pluralism.  By making adjustments early on, the reformers “hoped 
to preempt an anticommunist backlash by gaining credit for their responsiveness to 
political change” (Munck and Leff, 1999, p. 9). 
As the communist party struggled to develop a consensus on how to react 
to the growing economic problems, opposition parties sprang up.  As the first opposition 
party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum found initial support among a group of 
Hungarian writers who had long criticized the Kádár regime.  The party gained 
bargaining power as “all critical forces” of the opposition lined up behind them between 
late 1987 and summer 1988.  (Lengyel, 1992, pp. 34-5)  In the latter months of 1988, 
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other opposition parties formed, including the Federation of Young Democrats, the 
Alliance of Free Democrats, and the Social Democrats (Körösényi, 1992, p. 6). 
While the communist party dealt with its own internal problems, the 
opposition developed to the point that it could exert pressure on the government by the 
summer of 1989.  The negotiations between the official party and the opposition elite as 
well as the reburial of Imre Nagy were manifestations of this growing power.  The 
recognition of the opposition by the communist party, especially the reformist elements 
within it, demonstrates that the ruling elite recognized the opposition elite as a legitimate 
political actor.  The Great Pact developed as a compromise between these two political 
institutions; it “reflected the relatively equitable balance of power between rulers and 
opposition and the broad consensus for change” (Munck and Leff, 1999, p. 9).  Still, the 
communists dictated the overall pace of change. 
 The communists' trend of attempting to stay one step ahead of the 
opposition led it to rename its party as the Hungarian Socialist Party.  Although political 
pressure certainly shaped the environment in which this decision was made, it was a 
unilateral move by the communist party.  This decision signaled that the regime was 
ready to cede a significant portion of its power to the opposition.  The opposition 
recognized the importance of this change and secured further changes through a 
referendum that led to the parliamentary elections in spring 1990 (Rothschild and 
Wingfield, 2000, pp. 243-4).  Thus, the political parties played a predominate role in the 
Hungarian transition. 
Meanwhile, the remaining elite institutions either stayed aloof from the 
transition process or were co-opted into the political parties.  Government bureaucracies 
remained largely uninvolved in the transition process.  Although weakened, the 
communist party controlled the other government organizations throughout the transition 
(Lengyel, 1992, p. 30).  For example, although the police dispersed some of the initial 
antigovernment demonstrations, they did so under the direction of the communist party.  
Furthermore, when the party abandoned repression, the police cooperated and did not act 
independently of the state.  (Körösényi, 1992, p. 5)  Thus, throughout the transition, the 
government bureaucracies played a very minor role. 
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Meanwhile, independent political elites were largely co-opted into the 
emerging opposition parties.  As previously mentioned, an intelligentsia had been active 
throughout Kádár's regime, but these intellectuals only became a significant political 
force when they coalesced into parties and mobilized dissatisfied elements of the 
populace (Bozóki, 1992a, p. 16; Lengyel, 1992, p. 34).  Thus, the influential independent 
elite in Hungary during the transition chose to exert their power through the opposition 
parties, and independent elite actors who did not join parties exerted little influence on 
the process. 
b. Mass-Based Institutions 
Mass-based institutions compose the second category of political 
institutions that may affect any given transition.  Examples of mass-based institutions that 
may contribute to a transition include the populace at large, such as may be involved in 
large-scale demonstrations, and groups within civil society, such as mass-based political 
parties, domestic non-governmental organizations, non-state unions, and social 
organizations.  This section examines the role of these mass-based institutions in 
Hungary’s transition. 
Clearly, by the late 1980s, Hungarians showed signs of disapproval with 
the communist regime.  “The flourishing of quasi-political clubs and societies in civil 
society also characterized this period.”  (Körösényi, 1992, p. 2)  Moreover, the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum did hold public mass meetings in the winter of 1987-1988.  However, 
even by the de facto demise of the communist party in late 1989, less than 1 percent of 
adults in Hungary were members of independent political organizations (Bruszt, 1992, p. 
48).  The lack of mass-based mobilization appears to have been partly a result of the 
lessons the populace learned during the 1956 revolution.  Because the revolution failed, 
much of the populace resigned itself to being unable to change its future through 
collective political action.  (Bozóki, 1992b, p. 164)  These attitudes slowed mass 
participation in political parties and contributed to the elitist nature of early Hungarian 
political parties in the late 1980s.  Thus, organized political activity among civil society 
groups remained mainly absent from the transition process. 
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Despite this lack of registered participation, Hungarians could have 
exerted pressure through other groups or through popular demonstrations.  Indeed, some 
demonstrations did occur once the communist regime permitted them.  In the summer of 
1988, more than 100,000 Hungarians participated in an anti-Ceauşescu protest.  Later in 
the year, Hungarians protested against their own government's plan to dam the Danube 
River.  (Körösényi, 1992, pp. 5-6)  Although a few demonstrations took place and 
although they served to express dissatisfaction with the communist regime, they were 
non-violent and were not specifically aimed at toppling the Hungarian Socialist Workers' 
Party (Bruszt, 1992, p. 46).  Nevertheless, these mass demonstrations may have served to 
limit the options available to the communist regime and secure the balance of political 
power in favor of the opposition elites vis-à-vis the communist party (Bozóki, 1992b, p. 
176).   
Throughout this period, workers unions remained largely inactive (Bruszt, 
1992, p. 46).  Again, this reflects the lack of popular faith in the ability to challenge the 
status quo through organized political pressure.  Instead of mobilizing existing 
institutions, the Hungarian masses believed that these institutions could not be converted 
into effective political tools.  Failing to capitalize on the changing political environment, 
they continued to seek only individual advancement within the existing communist 
system (Bozóki, 1992b, p. 176).  Thus, the mass-based institutions that did exist in 
Hungary never played a pivotal role in the transition, even though the civil society groups 
experienced some growth in numbers and the populace participated in some 
demonstrations.  
c. External Institutions 
External institutions are the third type of political institutions that can 
affect transitions.  Examples of external institutions that could help or hinder a transition 
include the following: other states, external non-governmental organizations, and inter-
governmental organizations.  This section examines the role of each in Hungary’s 
transition. 
Other states played the most prominent role among external institutions in 
creating favorable conditions for the transition.  Unsurprisingly, the most influential 
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states, the Soviet Union and the United States, were the dominant Cold War actors.  
Although the Soviet Union was aware of the imminent changes in Hungary, it took few 
actions to help or hinder the reform movement.  Essentially, the lack of Soviet support for 
the hardliners served as an implicit affirmation of the reforms.  “Through the winter and 
spring of 1989, [the Soviets] repeatedly indicated their judgment that Hungary’s internal 
politics did not impinge on Soviet security interests; that it was up to the Hungarians to 
decide what political arrangements, institutions, and personalities they deemed most 
suitable for themselves; and that they had no intention of intervening even on behalf of 
Communism itself, let alone any particular Hungarian leader.”  (Rothschild and 
Wingfield, 2000, p. 243)  Of course, this situation differed greatly from the past, when 
the Soviet Union’s disapproval could easily quell criticism of the communist party 
throughout the Soviet bloc (Schöpflin, 1992, p. 100).  For example, when the Soviets felt 
threatened by events in Hungary in 1956, they ultimately intervened harshly and 
militarily to destroy the revolution and re-impose communism (Rothschild and 
Wingfield, 2000, p. 160).  Thus, while the Soviet Union did not force changes in Hungary 
in the late 1980s, its inaction produced the political space in which the Hungarian 
transition could take place. 
Throughout the 1980s, Soviet bloc countries began to recognize that the 
Soviet model, centered on a command economy, was illegitimate.  By the end of the 
decade, it became apparent that the Soviet Union had lost the Cold War.  (Bozóki, 1992b, 
p. 172)  Thus, by 1989 Hungary was much more receptive and responsive to pressure 
from the United States.  For example, the approaching visit of President Bush to Hungary 
in 1989 served as an additional motivation for the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party to 
begin the round-table talks with the opposition parties during the summer of that year 
(Körösényi, 1992, p. 8).  Thus, as the Soviet Union essentially removed its influence 
from Hungary in 1989, the United States and the West in general filled the role of the 
dominant external institution. 
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Besides the involvement or lack thereof by the superpowers, the role of 
external institutions in Hungary’s transition was minimal.  The Cold War balance of 
power minimized the importance of inter-governmental organizations, such as the United 
Nations, because the United States and the Soviet Union provided the leading sources of 
external influence on their respective satellite states.  Similarly, due to the previously-
closed nature of the Soviet bloc states, external non-governmental organizations did not 
have the access to Hungary that might have provided them an opportunity to significantly 
manipulate the transitional environment.  Overall, the Cold War environment ensured 
that the major external institutions involved in the Hungarian transition would be the 
superpower states, and even their influence was mainly indirect. 
3. Reassessing Hungary’s Mode of Transition 
Drawing on an understanding of the relative weight of the elite, mass-based, and 
external institutions on Hungary’s transition, this section reassess Karl and Schmitter’s 
initial characterization of the country’s mode of transition.  Karl and Schmitter describe 
Hungary's transition as beginning as an imposition by the communist party but eventually 
incorporating elites from opposition groups.  Meanwhile, the masses remained alienated 
from both processes.  (1991, p. 277)  Karl and Schmitter’s explanation is generally valid, 
but it should nevertheless be reviewed. 
Certainly, the Hungarian transition began with the reform movement in the 
Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party.  This does point to imposition as the initial cause of 
the transition.  However, once the opposition had developed enough to engage in 
discussion with the official party, the pacted part of the transition began.  In fact, some 
authors stress the pacted aspect of the transition.  László Bruszt provides one such 
interpretation of the events: 
One should first ask what did not happen in Hungary.  Unless one regards 
the ‘sausage strike’ organized by the official trade union to protest at 
meat-price increases as one, there were no significant strike movements.  
Aside from two important mass actions in March and in June, there were 
no nationwide anti-government demonstrations involving hundreds of 
thousands or millions of people as in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia.  No 
violent action took place, and no overt threat of the use of force was made, 
except for one made by a small-businessman member of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers party.  Everyone believed he was a mental retard.  Well, 
then, what did take place in Hungary?  Negotiations!  (1992, p. 46) 
This statement not only suggests that the pacted aspect of the transition was dominant, it 
clearly places the Hungarian transition in the elite, as opposed to the mass, category.   
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However, his viewpoint places too much weight on the role of negotiations.  In 
the end, the Great Pact did not cause the transition.  Instead, the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party renamed itself and waited for the opposition to present organized 
demands for change, which soon materialized in the form of pressure for parliamentary 
elections.  If the opposition had been more organized during the summer of 1989 and if 
the opposition radicals had joined the opposition moderates in signing the Great Pact, the 
Hungarian transition could have easily been characterized as pacted.  Nevertheless, 
because the opposition did not reach a consensus on the negotiations, the transition 
remained heavily influenced by the self-imposed reforms of the communists.  The 
communists recognized that they were finished as a party, and their biggest challenge in 
the imposition process was the lack of a coherent opposition to take their place. 
Taking this progression of events into account, Figure 3 provides a reassessment 
of Karl and Schmitter’s initial characterization of Hungary’s mode of transition.  Figure 3 
places Hungary directly between the pact and imposition modes, moving it slightly more 
towards the pacted corner than Karl and Schmitter propose in Figure 2.  This reflects both 
the reality of imposition and the attempt to create a pacted transition.  Figure 3 retains  
 
Figure 3. Hungary’s Mode of Transition 
After Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 276 
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Karl and Schmitter’s positioning in terms of the elites-masses axis.  This accurately 
reflects the predominance of elite institutions in the transition process, acknowledging 
that while the political parties did have some mass support, the masses remained largely 
uninvolved in forcing the transition.  In addition, Figure 3 adds a third axis that Karl and 
Schmitter do not include.  This third axis, mathematically the z-axis, allows Figure 3 to 
differentiate between internal and external institutions.  Admittedly, this third axis 
remains relatively crude in that it does not show the relative weight of different types of 
external institutions, as do the x- and y-axes for the internal institutions.  Nevertheless, it 
does allow the reader to visualize the importance, or lack thereof, of external institutions 
in the transition process.  In Hungary’s case, the external influence remained low and 
mainly indirect, justifying the low position of Hungary along the z-axis.  Generally, 
Figure 3 shows that Karl and Schmitter’s initial characterization remains valid. 
B. POLAND 
According to Karl and Schmitter (1991, p. 276-7), Poland clearly falls within the 
reform mode of transition.  This section briefly describes Poland’s transition, analyzes the 
importance of different political institutions in the transition, and reassesses Poland’s 
mode of transition.  While different modes of transition characterized Poland’s transition 
at different times, this section argues that Karl and Schmitter's location of Poland’s mode 
of transition is valid given their methodology. 
1. Transition: 1980-1990 
Even more so than in the case of Hungary, the transition in Poland spanned 
several years, and the ultimate collapse of communism resulted from a series of gradual 
reforms made throughout the 1980s.  The initial steps towards a transition took place in 
response to the government decision to raise the price of meat during the summer of 
1980.  Motivated by growing economic hardships and increasing inequalities in 
consumption, workers reacted to the price increases by striking.  (Lee, 2001, 96-7)  The 
strikers displayed a remarkable level of cohesion, building the Solidarity movement 
around the Committee for the Defense of Workers, which had been organized in 1976 by 
intellectuals and had the implicit support of the Roman Catholic Church.  The workers’ 
unity contrasted with the growing fragmentation of the communist party, which was 
under the control of the first secretary, Edward Gierek.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, 
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pp. 196, 198-99)  The critical difference between this series of strikes and previous ones 
was the resulting politicization of the long-extant economic problems (Lee, 2001, p. 97). 
Solidarity, represented by Lech Wałęsa, entered in negotiations with the 
government in late summer of 1980, and both sides signed the Gdansk accords (Lee, 
2001, p. 97; Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 199-200).  The Gdansk accords 
achieved a reversal of the price increases as well as several more political concessions, 
including the right to strike, the right to form independent unions, the opening of the 
media to alternative opinions, and the increased transparency of the government.  Despite 
this progress, the communists agreed that Solidarity should not be allowed to threaten 
directly Poland’s ties with the Soviet Union or to become a major power broker within 
the Polish political realm.  Concurrently, the communists replaced Gierek with Stanisław 
Kania as the first secretary.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 200-1)  However, 
Kania’s attempts to control Solidarity proved unable to sufficiently assuage the Soviets 
and the hardliners within the official Polish United Workers’ Party, and, by late 1981, 
General Wojciech Jaruzelski had succeeded him as first secretary (Lee, 2001, pp. 97-8; 
Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 201). 
As protests continued later in 1981, Jaruzelski eventually responded by imposing 
martial law in December, and the communists gradually consolidated around a position 
that favored repression over reform (Lee, 2001, p. 98).  As the communists forced 
Solidarity underground, a stalemate developed in Poland.  Jaruzelski retained the political 
power, although he lacked popular legitimacy.  Conversely, popular organizations, in 
spite of enjoying the support of the populace, could no longer access the political arena.  
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 202-3)  The political situation in Poland remained 
relatively constant for the following half decade. 
The stalemate eased in 1988 following the Soviet Union’s announcement that the 
Central European members of the Soviet bloc could not longer rely on Soviet military 
intervention to save communism in their countries.  Moreover, Mikhail Gorbachev 
voiced his support for political reforms within Poland.  In this context, Jaruzelski soon 
switched his backing from repression to reform.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 
227-9)  By the spring of 1988, strikes returned to Poland with workers demanding higher 
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wages and the re-legalization of Solidarity (Lee, 2001, p. 98; Rothschild and Wingfield, 
2000, p. 229). 
In response to the reinvigorated social pressure, Jaruzelski opted to begin round-
table talks with Wałęsa, and these negotiations took place during the winter and spring of 
1989 despite a lack of support from the extremist elements of both the communists and 
the opposition (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 230).  The talks resulted in the desired 
re-legalization of Solidarity and set a date for parliamentary elections (Lee, 2001, p. 98).  
The June elections, in which Solidarity could contest a third of the seats in the lower 
house, or Sejm, and all of the seats in the newly-formed upper house, gave all but nine of 
the contested 261 seats to the opposition.  Even so, Jaruzelski was confirmed as 
president, as the two sides implicitly had agreed upon previously.  (Rothschild and 
Wingfield, 2000, pp. 203-1) 
The failure of the communists in these first open elections assured that their 
political longevity was rapidly faltering.  In January 1990, the Polish United Workers’ 
Party held its final party congress in which the communists split into two separate social 
democratic movements.  Amidst this disintegration, Jaruzelski proved unable to form a 
governing coalition.  Eventually, the Solidarity movement secured the prime ministerial 
position for their own candidate, Tadeusz Mazowiecki.  Having been somewhat sidelined 
by the movement he created, Wałęsa reentered the political realm and called for the 
resignation of Jaruzelski from the presidency.  Jaruzelski obliged and stepped down early.  
After elections in the fall and winter of 1990, Wałęsa became the president of Poland in 
late December 1990, thus fully ending communist control of the country.  (Rothschild 
and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 231-5) 
2. Political Institutions 
a. Elite Institutions 
Elite institutions form the first category of institutions to be analyzed.  
With the exception of the communist party, elite institutions, such as the opposition party 
leadership, played a limited role throughout Poland’s transition. 
The communist elite, organized in the form of the Polish United Workers’ 
Party, was the only consistently active elite actor throughout the transition in Poland.  
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Despite its enduring strength through most of the 1980s, the communist party’s control 
began to wane as early as 1980.  The cause of this degradation of power rested in the 
inability of the communists to retain a unified political position.  Gierek’s actions became 
increasingly inadequate in the late 1970s, and price increases appeared to be the only 
remaining solution to a worsening Polish economy (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 
197-8).  Indeed, some communist hardliners supported the price increases and saw them 
as an opportunity to recommit Poland to communism through repression of the strikes 
that were sure to follow.  However, the reformers within the communist party recognized 
that price increases would only create more problems for the party, just as they had in 
1970 and 1976.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 195, 197-8)  Thus, on the eve of 
the beginning of the transition, the communists remained firmly in control but lacked a 
viable plan for the country. 
The degree of floundering within the communist party displayed itself in 
the rapid changes in the organization’s leadership.  Kania replaced Gierek within a little 
over two months after the latter had ordered price increases.  Kania, unable to provide a 
solution, survived for approximately five more months, until Jaruzelski became prime 
minister in the winter of 1981.  As a military leader, Jaruzelski represented a last resort 
for the party.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 201)  At this point, the military was 
one of the most popular institutions in Poland, due in large part to its refusal to support 
the use of force against strikers throughout the 1970s and in 1980.  However, Jaruzelski’s 
declaration of martial law tarnished the military’s pristine reputation and, along with the 
party’s inability to boost the economy, further alienated the masses (Lee, 2001, p. 101-2).   
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Ultimately, the communist party under Jaruzelski succeeded in restoring 
order to Poland, but it did not find a remedy for the problems within the party.  By the 
mid-1980s, the hardliners within the party thought that Jaruzelski had not gone far 
enough to silence the opposition, and they supported the police assassination of an 
opposition priest in late 1984 (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 203).  On the other 
hand, the reformers sought greater concessions within the communist framework to 
appease the masses (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 228).  Changes in the Soviet 
Union prompted Jaruzelski to move toward the reform group, and the unilateral granting 
of amnesty in fall 1986 followed by the submission of the economic plans to a national 
referendum in 1987 demonstrated a shift towards liberalization.  In spite of continued 
hardliner opposition, Jaruzelski led the reform movement into the round-table talks with 
Solidarity in 1989.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 229-30)   
After the elections, Jaruzelski continued as president, and most of the 
power appeared to be with the communist reformers.  Through the office of the president, 
the communists had the ability to dissolve parliament, control the military, and fill the 
government bureaucracies with their own nominees.  However, the dramatic lack of 
support for the communists, as displayed in the elections, quickly produced a de facto 
degradation of the party’s power.  (Kloć, 1991, p.16)  This change led to the splintering 
of the party in early 1990 (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 231), effectively 
undermining the institutional power of the party. 
In addition to the communist party, another elite institution was present in 
the form of the Solidarity movement.  The predecessor to Solidarity, the Committee for 
the Defense of Workers, included intellectuals and professionals within its membership 
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 199).  However, with the rise of Solidarity in 1980, 
the intelligentsia within the opposition was largely co-opted into or overshadowed by the 
mass-based movement (Kloć, 1991, p. 14; Taras, 1995, p. 100).  Ultimately, the 
Committee for the Defense of Workers disbanded in 1981, having served most 
importantly as a model for other opposition groups, such as Solidarity (Taras, 1995,p. 
106).  Thus, the concept of an opposition elite independent from the masses does not 
accurately characterize the Polish situation. 
Overall, the communists remained the dominant elite actors in Poland 
throughout the transition.  Opposition elites never gained a firm, independent footing in 
Poland because most were incorporated into the growing mass-based institutions. 
b. Mass-Based Institutions 
In comparison to the elite institutions, mass-based institutions played a 
more visible and dominant role in Poland’s transition.  These civil-society organizations, 
best represented by the Roman Catholic Church and the mass-based Solidarity 
movement, became the driving force for change in Poland during the 1980s. 
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The Roman Catholic Church was an important mass-based institution 
during the Polish transition.  The Church had consistently maintained a relatively high 
level of separation from the government throughout the period of communist rule (Kloć, 
1991, p. 13; Taras, 1995, p. 96).  This separation allowed the Church to serve as an 
“umbrella organization” for the mass-based organizations in civil society.  Pope John 
Paul II’s visit to his Polish homeland in 1979 sparked large, peaceful gatherings that 
presaged the non-violent mass-based movements of the 1980s.  Indeed, the Church 
emerged as the institution commanding the greatest trust from Poles in a survey in 1981.  
(Lee, 2001, pp. 102-3)   
Elements within the Church that favored political reforms steadily gained 
influence among the Polish Catholic hierarchy as communist rule progressed.  Although 
the Church attacked the declaration of martial law, some elements of the Church initially 
distanced themselves from the Solidarity movement.  (Taras, 1995, pp. 96-9)  During this 
period, the Church “also recommended tactical restraint and strategic moderation lest 
Poland again lose its sovereignty” (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 200).  After the 
Church failed to decry the assassination of a radical priest in 1984, its influence began to 
slowly wane (Taras, 1995, pp. 99-100).  The last significant actions on the part of the 
Church occurred before the 1990 presidential elections when it gained some concessions 
from candidates, including Wałęsa, who did not want to alienate Catholic voters 
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 234).  Overall, the most important action of the 
Church was to allow opportunities for the development of opposition movements during 
the communist regime. 
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Meanwhile, organized workers, especially skilled workers, formed the 
initial cadre for the non-Catholic mass-based movements in Poland (Taras, 1995, p. 100).  
Indeed, workers’ unions had existed throughout the communist regime, but only in the 
1970s did enough resentment amass in response to economic hardships to push these 
groups toward political action (Kloć, 1991, p. 14).  The price increases in 1980 served as 
the turning point for the workers’ organizations and led to the emergence of the Solidarity 
movement.  Although the Committee for the Defense of Workers fostered much of the 
initial cooperation among workers’ groups (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 198-9), 
the Solidarity movement soon moved beyond this elitist base to incorporate “workers and 
white-collar employees, intellectuals and entrepreneurs, Catholics and communists” 
(Taras, 1995, p. 102).  The wide variety of social sectors composing Solidarity, along 
with its vast membership, solidly characterized the movement as a mass-based one.  
Although Wałęsa controlled Solidarity de jure, his authority often appeared ineffective in 
directing the actions of the masses in his organization.  Indeed, the resulting 
unmanageability of Solidarity proved to be own of its greatest powers  (Taras, 1995, p. 
102). 
In spite of its initial success, Solidarity was not without its own troubles.  
Still threatened by the communist regime and losing membership by late 1981, it did not 
have enough strength to openly challenge the assertion of martial law (Taras, 1995, pp. 
104-5).  Solidarity moved underground for most of the decade following the 
government’s decision to de-legalize the movement in 1982.  Solidarity used this period 
and its accompanying economic deterioration to attract renewed mass support.  It 
continued to promote strikes, and the mass protests in 1988 succeeded in forcing 
negotiations with the communists early the following year.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 
2000, pp. 202-3; Kloć, 1991, pp. 14-5)  Support for Solidarity in the subsequent 
parliamentary elections demonstrated the overwhelming popular backing that the 
movement enjoyed and with which the movement was able to achieve significant 
political concessions from the communists.  Overall, the mass-based institution of 
Solidarity gradually replaced the Roman Catholic Church as the most prominent actor in 
Poland’s transition. 
c. External Institutions 
Composing the third type of political institutions, external institutions also 
played a role in shaping the transition in Poland.  Unsurprisingly, the major external 
institutions included the Soviet Union and the collective West.  This, of course, reflected 
the Cold War environment that dominated the political interactions between the 
superpowers and their satellite states. 
As alluded to earlier, the Soviet Union's primary contribution to the 
transition was to create the necessary political space for reforms in Poland to progress.  
However, this did not occur until the mid-1980s.  In the early part of the decade, the 
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Soviet Union, fearing that strikes might spread to other countries within the Soviet bloc, 
pressured Kania to contain the Solidarity movement.  This external pressure was an 
influence in the Polish communists' decision to replace Kania with Jaruzelski.  Soviet 
dissatisfaction, manifested by unusually large military exercises, continued to affect 
Jaruzelski's decision making with the instatement of martial law in late 1981.  
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 201-2)   
Despite the earlier repressive action favored by the Soviet Union, the 
political room to maneuver gradually expanded after Gorbachev introduced reforms into 
the Soviet system.  The political opening in the Soviet Union corresponded with a 
relinquishing of control over the Central European members of the Soviet bloc.  (Lee, 
2001, p. 99)  In 1987 and 1988, Gorbachev continued to support Jaruzelski amid 
mounting opposition pressure in Poland.  However, the Soviets now urged the communist 
hardliners in Poland to pursue political change, and the Poles acquiesced.  (Rothschild 
and Wingfield, 2000, p. 229)  Moreover, in 1989 the foreign ministers of the Warsaw 
Pact countries met in Poland and decided to null the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had 
previously allowed military intervention in Central Europe by the Soviet Union (Lee, 
2001, p. 99).  Cumulatively, these changes allowed Solidarity to operate with more 
freedom and without the fear of triggering a Soviet crackdown in Poland. 
 Throughout this period of shifting Soviet strategy, the West consistently 
acted in support of liberalization and democratization in Poland.  Beginning with the 
Carter administration and continuing through that of Reagan, the United States exerted 
significant human rights pressure on Poland.  Western European countries also pressured 
Poland to increase its respect for the basic rights of its citizens.  For example, when the 
communists declared martial law in Poland in 1981, the United States responded with 
sanctions against the regime.  These measures remained in place until late 1984, when 
Polish political dissidents received amnesty and were released from prison.  In a later 
instance, Vice President Bush paid his respects to the assassinated opposition priest 
during an official visit in Poland.  (Lee, 2001, p. 100)  These actions demonstrated the 
West's desire to advance the degree and pace of political reforms in Poland. 
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Ultimately, both the East and the West pressured Polish communists 
during the 1980s.  Initially these pressures were in opposite directions, but after the 
Soviet Union adopted its own reforms, both superpowers pressed for political openings in 
Poland. 
3. Reassessing Poland's Mode of Transition 
With an understanding of the relative weight of the elite, mass-based, and external 
institutions on the Polish transition, this section reassess Karl and Schmitter’s initial 
characterization of Poland's mode of transition.  Karl and Schmitter argue that Poland's 
transition progressed through the following modes of transition: mass-based pressure and 
a pact in the early 1980s, imposition of martial law in the mid-1980s, more mass-based 
pressures and a second pact in the late 1980s, and mass-based reform movement at the 
very end of the transition.  Due to the initial and final presence of mass-based pressures 
and their continued presence throughout the 1980s, Karl and Schmitter firmly locate 
Poland's mode of transition in the reform category.  (Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 276)  
Although this work moves Poland's position slightly, it does concur with Karl and 
Schmitter's decision to characterize the Polish transition as reform-based. 
The presence and influence of politically-active Polish workers and the Solidarity 
movement from 1980 through 1990 clearly lends support to characterizing Poland's 
transition as one of reform.  Indeed, the strikes in 1980 and again in 1988 and 1989 
forced the communists to respond with political concessions.  The pacts were a direct 
reaction to the mass-based power of Solidarity and were not merely an agreement 
between two elite institutions operating independent of the masses.   
Even so, some authors emphasize the pacted aspect of the transition.  Munck and 
Leff argue, “[T]he Polish transition began when incumbent elites allowed a marginalized 
opening that undermined the basic outlines of the ancien régime, while retaining 
sufficient control over the transition process to force antiincumbent elites to negotiate” 
(1999, p. 7).  This interpretation ignores the events before 1989, minimizes the 
importance of the masses, and overstates the degree of imposition.  Despite the ability of 
the communists to delay reforms in the mid-1980s, their lack of strength and their 
inability to find a solution to Poland's economic problems or their internal party divisions 
37 
suggests that the communists, in effect, were waiting for the mass-based opposition to 
develop enough power to be able to control the transition process.  The communist elite 
influence acted more as a braking force rather than a propelling one for change. 
Based on the events throughout Poland's long transitional period, Figure 4 locates 
the Polish transition within the reform category.  However, recognizing the influence of 
the Great Pact, it moves Poland's location more closely towards the pacted mode than 
does Karl and Schmitter's assessment in Figure 2.  However, keeping Poland within the 
confines of the reform mode recognizes that the pacted aspects of its transitions were 
clearly driven by constant, widespread mass-based pressure.  Acknowledging the 
influence of the communist party but refusing to characterize that influence as 
imposition, Figure 4 moves Poland's position only slightly to the right, towards the elite 
portion of the x-axis, of Karl and Schmitter's positioning in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 4. Poland's Mode of Transition 
After Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 276 
Finally, Figure 4 places greater emphasis on internal than external institutions in 
Poland's transition.  The pressure, or reduction thereof, from the Soviet Union and the 
West served to create additional political space within Poland and did not directly cause 
political change.  Lee summarizes this viewpoint well: 
[W]e must not overemphasize the external factors over internal incentives 
in the process of democratization.  The change in the Former Soviet Union 
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did not propel transformations in Poland; what it did was to remove the 
crucial factor that had been blocking them.  In other words, the constraint 
was external, but the impetus was internal.  (2001, p. 100) 
This quote supports the location of Poland's transition on the internal side of the z-axis.  
Essentially, Poland's location along this axis mirrors that of Hungary as both countries 
received similar pressure from external institutions. 
 Overall, Karl and Schmitter's assessment of Poland's mode of transition remains 
valid.  Although Figure 4 moves Poland's position very slightly towards the pacted and 
imposition modes, it leaves it within the reform category, which most accurately 
describes the Polish transition. 
C. ROMANIA 
According to Karl and Schmitter (1991, p. 276-7), Romania provides the closest 
example among the Soviet bloc countries of a transition by revolution.  This section 
reviews the transitional events, analyzes the importance of different political institutions 
in Romania’s transition, and reassesses Karl and Schmitter’s characterization of 
Romania’s mode of transition.  Due to the overwhelming influence of mass-based 
pressure in the Romanian transition, this section argues that Karl and Schmitter's location 
of Romania’s mode of transition should be adjusted slightly so that it unequivocally falls 
within the bounds of the revolution category. 
1. Transition: 1989-1990 
The most radical aspects of the Romanian transition away from Soviet-style 
communism clearly occurred between 1989 and 1990.  To understand why the transition 
advanced so suddenly, one needs to be somewhat familiar with the political environment 
in Romania in the years preceding 1989.  Nicolae Ceauşescu rose to power in Romania in 
the early 1970s and, despite communist party problems in other Soviet bloc countries, 
maintained firm control of Romania until his precipitous decline in late 1989 (Treptow, 
1996, pp. 540-2, 554).  During the 1980s, Ceauşescu promoted grandiose industrial goals 
at the economic expense of the country and at a high social cost to the masses, who 
generally remained paralyzed by a fear of the regime (Ratesh, 1991, pp. 1-9).  Thus, a 
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hard-line regime and an intimidated populace accurately described the situation in 
Romania throughout most of the decade. 
The first violent strike occurred in the fall of 1987.  Led by economically-
dissatisfied workers and soon joined by other Romanians, the strike developed strong 
political overtones.  Unsurprisingly, the government responded with harsh measures of 
repression.  (Ratesh, 1991, pp. 9-11)  By early 1989, dissent began to rise within the 
communist party as well.  Although Ceauşescu had successfully eliminated any 
opposition within his party during the course of his regime, in March 1989 a group of 
moderate communists published a letter in which they exposed the regime’s abuses and 
demanded Ceauşescu’s resignation (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 246; Treptow, 
1996, p. 553).  Again, Ceauşescu responded with repression, isolating the authors of the 
letter (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 246).  Thus, until their ultimate demise, 
Communist hardliners remained in control of Romania. 
In December 1989, the communists lost that power.  Seeking to maintain the 
communists’ grip on power, the state security apparatus, the Securitate, pressed for the 
transfer of an opposition priest from Timişoara to a smaller town.  Although the church 
hierarchy agreed, the priest did not acquiesce.  On 15 December, members of the priest’s 
congregation as well as much of the population of Timişoara demonstrated around his 
church and blocked his transfer.  Within two days, workers and students had joined the 
protest and transformed the religious disturbance into a political uprising.  (Rothschild 
and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 247-8)  Ceauşescu responded with force to break up the protests 
(Tismăneanu, 1997, pp. 416-7). 
On 21 December, Ceauşescu ordered a popular rally to amass support for his 
position.  However, the masses gathered for the event soon turned against the 
communists and, storming the Central Committee building, forced Ceauşescu to flee.  
(Tismăneanu, 1997, pp. 417)  Clashes between the masses and security forces continued.  
Ceauşescu was captured, and a military court ordered his execution on Christmas.  
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 248)  In ten days, Ceauşescu’s reign had collapsed. 
With no organized opposition to reorient the government, other communists, 
military leaders, and some members of the masses took control of the Romanian 
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government (Tismăneanu, 1997, pp. 417).  These groups coalesced under the National 
Salvation Front, which took control of Romania’s political future.  Elections in May 1990 
“produced” a victory for the National Salvation Front and its leader, Ion Iliescu.  
Although the Front claimed to be pro-democratic, it resorted to establishing a Leninist 
Socialist Party late in the year to further distance its previously-communist leadership 
from the past.  Meanwhile, the multitude of opposition parties remained too weak and 
fragmented to establish a viable alternative to the continuation of the Soviet-era 
leadership under its new name.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 249-50)  Popular 
protests did continue, but the Front organized successful, violent counterdemonstrations 
(Călinescu and Tismăneanu, 1991, p. 294). 
Despite the persistence of reformed communists in the Romanian government 
after the 1990 elections, a transition had occurred.  Although the opposition would not 
take control of the government until 1996, the early 1990s did see a growth in the 
organizational and electoral ability of opposition parties (Tismăneanu, 1997, pp. 420-6).  
Thus, even though ex-communists filled the political vacuum in late 1989 and early 1990, 
the transition had been assured by 1990. 
2. Political Institutions 
a. Elite Institutions 
Some elite institutions played an important role in the Romanian 
transition.  The Ceauşescu-controlled communist party dominated the elite institutions in 
Romania during the transition.  This section focuses on the role of the party as well as 
that of the security forces, including the army and the Securitate. 
The communist party dominated the elite institutions in Romania 
throughout its transition.  Although the size of the communist party did not differ much 
from other Soviet bloc states, the concentration of power in Ceauşescu and his family 
was remarkable.  During the 1970s, Ceauşescu’s wife, Elena, became a member of the 
communist central committee, and his brothers, son, and brothers-in-law all held 
important positions within the ministries of defense, internal affairs, and agriculture as 
well as within the communist youth organizations and the council of science and culture.  
Moreover, the party created the position of president specifically for Ceauşescu.  
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(Treptow, 1996, pp. 541-2)  These developments ensured that the communist regime 
became increasingly personalistic leading up to the transition in the late 1980s and 
effectively narrowed the scope of the communist elite within Romania. 
As party power coalesced around Ceauşescu’s inner circle, the hardliners 
simultaneously marginalized dissidents and reformers within the communist hierarchy.  
While this trend began in the 1960s and 1970s, it solidified in the 1980s.  Party members 
who expressed concern over the path of the regime remained at or were relegated to 
lower-level positions within the party and the state bureaucracy.  Iliescu was among this 
group that became increasingly unsuccessful in reorienting the regime’s direction.  
(Treptow, 1996, pp. 542, 545-6, 551)  Furthermore, Ceauşescu even rotated the hardliner 
members of the party through various positions and ministries in order to prevent them 
from challenging his control (Georgescu, 1991, p. 257).  Thus, Ceauşescu found himself 
isolated from the political rebellions occurring in 1989 and unable to draw upon any party 
support or point to an intra-party reform movement as a way around an immediate loss of 
power.  The increase in repression throughout the 1980s, highlighted by the decision to 
move the dissident priest out of Timişoara, further alienated the core party elite from the 
Romanian masses (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, 246-7). 
Intra-party dissent did emerge early in 1989 in the form of a letter 
authored by six long-time communist committee members.  Although this letter, which 
offered the hope of stimulating a reform movement within the party, received 
endorsement from two former first secretaries of the Romanian communist party, it failed 
to create a change within the Ceauşescu elite.  (Ratesh, 1991, p. 11)  The hardliners 
dismissed the letter’s authors from the party and restricted their basic civil liberties in a 
successful attempt to stem dissent within their ranks (Rothschild and Winfield, 2000, p. 
246). 
Throughout this period, the government bureaucracies with the most 
influence were the security forces.  Beginning in 1981, the army received increasingly 
higher levels of responsibility, especially in the economic sector, and eventually obtained 
control over several economic sub-ministries and projects (Georgescu, 1991, 261).  Until 
21 December 1989, the army remained loyal to the communist regime.  Essentially, this 
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loyalty was what would normally be characterized as good civil-military relations.  In 
response to the strikes, the army merely followed the orders issued from Ceauşescu, and, 
indeed, Ceauşescu assumed all of the responsibility for the army’s actions as late as 20 
December (Călinescu and Tismăneanu, 1991, p. 281).  However, when popular protests 
suddenly sapped the communists’ power on 21 December, dissidents within the military 
quickly followed the lead of the masses, taking prominent roles in the National Salvation 
Front (Călinescu and Tismăneanu, 1991, p. 284, 289).  Indeed, the fact that a military 
court tried and sentenced the Ceauşescus (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 248) 
suggests that the army remained loyal to whoever was in power at any given moment. 
As the other main component of Romanian security forces, the Securitate 
operated in much the same way as did the army.  The Securitate was responsible for 
preventing the rise of an organized opposition, and it relied on a dense network of 
informants to keep dissidents under control (Tismăneanu, 1997, p. 412).  The first major 
use of the Securitate in the 1980s came in 1987 when the organization responded to 
worker strikes with extreme repression and violence.  This scene repeated itself in 
December 1989 when harsh responses again followed the popular demonstrations.   
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 246-8)  Like the army, the Securitate followed 
orders from the party and did not initiate these actions of its own accord (Tismăneanu, 
1997, p. 414).  However, due to the actions of the Securitate during the transition, it 
became a convenient scapegoat on which the masses and the army placed significant 
blame for the revolution’s casualties (Ratesh, 1991, pp. 136-7).  Overall, all of the elite 
institutions, including the communist party and the security forces, that affected 
Romania’s transition were state-based and under the tight control of the Ceauşescu 
regime. 
b. Mass-Based Institutions 
Mass-based institutions form the second category of institutions that can 
affect regime transitions.  Although a few civil-society organizations became more vocal 
critics of the communists in the latter half of the 1980s, most of the opposition remained 
fractured until the violent outbreak in 1989. 
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Organized mass-based institutions remained scare in Romania throughout 
the early 1980s due to the actual and perceived effectiveness of the Securitate in 
shattering dissident movements in the prior decades (Treptow, 1996, pp. 552-3).  Despite 
the crackdowns, latent anger continued to build among the population due to the 
continually deteriorating economic situation.  As the communists sought more energy to 
power their grandiose industrial projects, they sold increasing amounts of local foodstuffs 
on the international market, and this resulted in a demoralizing food shortage in Romania 
(Ratesh, 1991, pp. 6-7).   
The majority of reactions to these circumstances during the 1980s began 
among individual intellectuals.  Schoolteachers, poets, writers, and human rights activists 
all contributed to the growing anti-communist literature of the late 1980s (Ratesh, 1991, 
pp. 13-4).  In addition, some of the intellectuals had been members of political parties 
that were outlawed in 1947.  These activists, some of whom organized the Romanian 
Democratic Action, did find some support among Romanian workers and youth, but their 
efforts centered on demanding respect for existing political guarantees in the constitution, 
as opposed to a sudden and complete change of regime.  (Georgescu, 1991, p. 277) 
Simultaneously, religious organizations did maintain a constant, albeit 
largely repressed, source of criticism for the regime.  Although the leading Orthodox 
Church generally remained quiet, one of its priests, Gheorghe Dumitreasa, gave ardently 
anti-communist sermons during the 1980s.  His actions resulted in imprisonment.  
Dissention was more widespread among evangelical churches, and their vigor and foreign 
connections proved a source of annoyance to the communist party.  (Ratesh, 1991, p. 13) 
Also, beginning in the mid-1980s, members of the Hungarian minority in Romania 
became more vocal, demanding government respect for their nationality and their cultural 
rights.  As an expression of their discontent, they succeeded in publishing Romania’s 
only independent periodical.  (Georgescu, 1991, p. 278)  
The growing frustration within the unorganized populace found its release 
in the workers’ strike of late 1987.  Unable to reach an agreement with their management, 
workers in Brasov turned economic complaints into political demonstrations as their 
“election” day march attracted support from other common Romanians.  The protestors 
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invaded the local party headquarters and burned communist literature and portraits of 
Ceauşescu.  (Ratesh, 1991, pp. 10)  This event was the first major popular outbreak to 
foreshadow the nationwide demonstrations of 1989. 
Unorganized protest, generally in the form of critical letters and anti-
government statements, did increase somewhat following the letter sent by the six 
dissenters within the communist party, but an organized opposition still did not emerge  
(Ratesh, 1991, p. 11).  Ultimately, the largest manifestation of popular opposition to the 
regime was in December 1989.  Parish members protesting against the transfer of their 
opposition priest from Timişoara on 16 December refused to disperse, and members of 
the police and army fired on them.  (Tismăneanu, 1997, p. 416)  The initiation of violence 
by the government triggered a coalescence of popular will that the limited opposition 
movements previously had been unable to achieve.  Thousands of protestors returned to 
the streets the following day, and the same scene was repeated (Tismăneanu, 1997, p. 
416).  News of the uprising in Timişoara spread throughout Romania, and on 21 
December mass demonstrations against Ceauşescu’s pro-government rally effectively 
ended the communist regime. 
Following the ouster of the communists, the opposition remained 
splintered.  The varied opposition parties remained too weak and fragmented to create a 
successful electoral challenge to the National Salvation Front during the May 1990 
elections.  This contributed to the victory of the Soviet-era leadership under its new 
name.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 249-50)   
Overall, the number of individual and organized civil-society movements 
in opposition to the communists grew throughout the 1980s.  However, they never 
reached the level of strength needed to openly challenge the government.  Ultimately, the 
repressed anti-government sentiment of the Romanian population arose as a reactionary 
and previously-unorganized mass rebellion in response to the communists’ attempt to use 
violence to maintain control. 
c. External Institutions 
External institutions form the third group of political institutions that may 
affect regime transitions.  In the case of Romania, not only did other states affect the 
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transition environment but also some influential non-governmental organizations became 
involved in shaping the political environment within the country. 
As was the case in most Central European transitions, the other Soviet 
bloc countries played a role in affecting the transition in Romania.  By December 1989, 
many of the communist regimes in the region had already been toppled.  The Ceauşescu 
elite could no longer rely on the threat of outside intervention to force its population into 
submission.  Essentially, Romania was isolated from the rest of Central Europe by the 
time of its transition.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 247)  Moreover, in November 
1989 the Soviet Union abandoned the Brezhnev Doctrine of intervening in Warsaw Pact 
states in support of communism (Călinescu and Tismăneanu, 1991, p. 280).  Indeed, 
immediately following the massacre in Timişoara the parliaments of Poland and Hungary 
voiced their disapproval of the human rights situation in Romania, and the Soviets 
expressed regret over the loss of life in Romania (Ratesh, 1991, p. 37).  Paradoxically, 
this lack of traditional sources of support caused the Romanian communist hardliners to 
increase their efforts at retaining control over the country (Rothschild and Wingfield, 
2000, p. 247).   
From the West, Romania felt pressure from states as well as non-
governmental organizations.  Through the middle of the 1980s, Western Europe and the 
United States had praised Romania for maintaining a fairly independent position within 
the Soviet bloc (Georgescu, 1991, p. 267).  However, by the end of the decade it became 
increasingly clear that the communist hardliners left Western hopes of liberalization in 
Romania unfulfilled.  The “gravitational pull” of the West, which seemed to have 
significant effects on other parts of Central Europe, (Parrott, 1997, p. 8) did not appear to 
have the same results on Romania, as evidenced by the continued hard-line position of 
the communist government. 
Nevertheless, several external, non-state actors played influential roles in 
the Romanian transition.  The Western press increasingly criticized the Romanian 
communist elites during the late 1980s.  They labeled Ceauşescu a “tyrant” and the “sick 
man of communism” and, in reference to its economic problems, referred to Romania as 
the “European Ethiopia.”  (Georgescu, 1991, p. 267-8)  Moreover, due to the lack of a 
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non-state, nationwide news service in Romania, the Western media played a crucial role 
in disseminating information to the Romanian populace concerning the unfolding 
rebellion on 16 December 1989.  By the following day, both the British Broadcasting 
Corporation and Radio Free Europe had alerted Romanians to the demonstrations in 
Timişoara.  This information contributed to a sense of urgency among the masses that 
was reinforced on 18 December by interviews with eyewitnesses of the events in 
Timişoara.  The same day, Radio Free Europe began repeating the following slogan: 
“Today in Timişoara, tomorrow in the whole country.”  (Ratesh, 1991, pp. 35-6) 
In reaction to the violence in Timişoara, Western governments 
strengthened their attacks on Romania’s communists.  The United States condemned the 
use of force, the United Kingdom pressed for communist insiders to end the regime, West 
Germany characterized the situation as abominable, and the European Economic 
Community suspended agreements with Romania (Ratesh, 1991, p. 36).  Nevertheless, 
these external pressures did not have a substantial impact on the hardliner regime. 
Overall, state institutions from the East and West had isolated Romania to 
little effect.  Even so, the spread of information via external non-governmental 
organizations did strengthen the masses’ resolve and help fuel the anti-communist 
demonstrations in the capital on 21 December (Treptow, 1996, p. 555). 
3. Reassessing Romania’s Mode of Transition 
Building on an understanding of the influence of the various political institutions 
on Romania’s transition, this section reassesses the country’s mode of transition.  Karl 
and Schmitter acknowledge that Romania’s transition was first a violent mass-based 
movement.  However, they assert that the “unclear” role of the Soviet Union, the elite, 
and the military following the overthrow of Ceauşescu pushed the transition towards the 
imposition mode (1991, p. 277).  This work challenges Karl and Schmitter’s latter 
description and argues that the Romanian transition falls clearly within the revolution 
category. 
The absence of elite opposition to Ceauşescu's hardliner regime left few options 
for disgruntled Romanians.  Attacking both reformers within the communist party and 
intellectual dissidents outside of the party allowed the Ceauşescu elite to keep a strong 
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grip on the country through fear and repression.  However, once the masses disregarded 
the intimidation tactics of the communist-controlled security forces, Ceauşescu lost his 
foundation of power.  After the mass-based uprising began in December 1989, the 
Romanian regime had no other options besides attempts at repressing the revolt.  There 
were no opposition groups with which to negotiate. 
Based on this course of events and the institutional environment in Romania prior 
to the transition, the collapse of Romanian communism must be characterized as 
occurring in the revolution mode of transition.  Negotiations, pacts, and reforms did not 
figure into the transitional equation in Romania.  Mass-based violence alone forced 
Ceauşescu to abandon his post and created the necessary political space for 
democratization. 
Despite the crucial involvement of the masses in Romania's transition away from 
communism, they remained relatively unorganized and ineffective between December 
1989 and May 1990 when the first elections took place.  During this period, the ex-
communists who formed the National Salvation Front did control the political 
environment.  However, their actions did not constitute imposition as much as merely 
protection of their own interests.  Thus, the events leading up to elections in post-
Ceauşescu Romania reflected disparate partisan strengths more than an organized attempt 
by the National Salvation Front to impose a transition; democratization was already 
assured by the mass-based revolution. 
Taking these events into account, Figure 5 locates Romania's transition firmly 
within the confines of the revolution mode of transition.  In comparison to Karl and 
Schmitter's location of Romania's mode of transition in Figure 2, Figure 5 moves 
Romania's location toward the masses end of the y-axis.  This reflects the primacy of the 
mass-based revolution in Romania's transition.  Simultaneously, locating Romania's 
transitional mode near the elite edge of the revolution category acknowledges the strength 
of the elite-based National Salvation Front in the immediate post-Ceauşescu political 
environment.  Figure 5 retains the location of Romania's transition relative to the y-axis 
as shown in Figure 2.  This demonstrates the violent nature of the Romania's mass-based 
revolution and the lack of negotiations in the transition. 
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Figure 5. Romania's Mode of Transition 
After Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 276 
In reference to the z-axis, Figure 5 locates Romania's transition near the internal 
end of the axis.  The internal, revolutionary nature of Romania's transition might suggest 
that external actors had less effect than Figure 5 recognizes.  Indeed, the superpowers and 
their satellite states had a minimal effect on forcing a transition in Romania.  However, 
the involvement of external non-governmental organizations, especially the foreign 
media, in alerting Romanians to the beginning of the revolution in Timişoara warrants 
placing Romania's transition closer to the external end of the z-axis than might otherwise 
be expected.  Figure 5 reflects this contribution of external political institutions to 
Romania's transition. 
Overall, Karl and Schmitter's characterization of Romania's transition places too 
much emphasis on imposition.  Recognizing that a mass-based rebellion dominated 
Romania's transition, Figure 5 corrects this by moving Romania's location clearly within 
the confines of the revolution mode of transition. 
D. BULGARIA 
Based on Karl and Schmitter’s assessment (1991, p. 276-7), Bulgaria provides the 
example of a country whose transition occurred through imposition.  After briefly 
reviewing the crucial events in Bulgaria’s transition, this study analyzes the importance 
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of different political institutions in the country’s transition and reassesses its mode of 
transition.  Ultimately, this section generally concurs with Karl and Schmitter's location 
of Bulgaria’s mode of transition in the imposition category. 
1. Transition: 1987-1990 
Although the crucial events in Bulgaria’s transition occurred during 1989 and 
1990, the proceedings begun in 1987 foreshadowed the coming.  As the head of Bulgaria 
and its communist party, Todor Zhivkov had successfully pursued political stability and 
economic development, and by the 1980s outsiders thought of Bulgaria as more resistant 
to reform efforts than some of its Central European neighbors (Rothschild and Wingfield, 
2000, p. 251).  However, due to the Bulgarian communists’ deference to the Soviet 
Union, the country soon came under pressure to institute changes.  In 1987, Zhivkov 
introduced a substantial reform plan, the “July Concept.”  Although this program 
promoted political democratization, freedom of the press, and semi-open elections, it 
proved to be only a rhetorical tool.  Initial changes disappeared by early 1988.  (Bell, 
1997, p. 357-8) 
In July 1988, Zhivkov dismissed dissident members of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party who had fallen out of favor with Zhivkov’s hardliner elites.  Also during 1988, the 
first fledgling dissident movements appeared in Bulgaria.  As change continued 
throughout the rest of the Soviet bloc, the government issued a second reform decree in 
January 1989.  “Decree No. 56” was an economic reform program ostensibly designed to 
bring perestroika to Bulgaria.  However, this program, like the July Concept, proved to 
be hastily planned and remained largely unimplemented.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 
2000, p. 252) 
By February 1989, opposition groups had become more vocal, but their protests 
did not significantly impact the communist regime (Bell, 1997, p. 358).  In June 1989, the 
communists began a nationalist campaign against the Turkish-Muslim minority in 
Bulgaria, motivating over 300,000 of them to flee to Turkey (Rothschild and Wingfield, 
2000, p. 252).  Government repression of the Turkish-Muslim minority was stimulated, in 
part, by growing anti-communist sentiment among that section of the population (Bell, 
1997, pp. 358-9). 
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Then, on 10 November 1989, the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party 
removed Zhivkov from power and systematically eliminated his cohorts and relatives 
from their posts within the party and government.  This action was a response to growing 
animosity among the communists towards Zhivkov’s policies, his growing separation 
from the Soviet Union’s policies, and his attempt to designate his unpopular son as his 
successor.  (Bell, 1997, pp. 359-60)   In addition, the decision reflected the desire of 
reformers within the party to forestall the collapse of Bulgaria’s communist regime in a 
style similar to other Soviet bloc countries (Daskalov, 1998, pp. 9-10). 
Petŭr Mladenov replaced Zhivkov as the party and state leader.  However, after 
videotape emerged showing him ordering tanks to move against a peaceful protest in 
December 1989, the party forced his resignation.  Mladenov’s successor, Aleksandŭr 
Lilov, took control of Bulgaria in February 1990, and he distanced the communists from 
their Soviet legacy by assuming the renamed party role of “party president.”  This 
followed the January renaming of the Bulgarian Communist Party as the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party.  Simultaneously, the regime ended censorship and agreed to round-table 
talks with the newly-formed Union of Democratic Forces opposition party.  (Rothschild 
and Wingfield, 2000, p. 253)   
The round-table talks prompted the government to implement laws in April 1990 
that allowed political parties and defined the electoral system (Bell, 1997, p. 364).  Freely 
and fairly contested elections took place in June 1990, and the Socialists captured the 
majority of votes.  Even so, the opposition managed to force the Socialists to accept the 
leader of the Union of Democratic Forces, Zhelyu Zhelev, as the new Bulgarian 
president.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 253)  Zhelev’s ascendancy to the position 
of president effectively marked the end of Bulgaria’s transition away from communism 
and towards democracy. 
2. Political Institutions 
a. Elite Institutions 
Elite institutions played a prominent role in Bulgaria’s transition.  The 
most important elite institutions were the Bulgarian Communist Party and its successor, 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party. 
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The communists dominated the political environment in Bulgaria 
throughout the early and mid-1980s.  The ability of the communist party to work with the 
Soviet Union and Western Europe ensured that the Bulgarian economy remained fairly 
strong during these years.  Furthermore, the party’s rhetoric against Bulgaria’s traditional 
enemies, such as Turkey, proved able to placate the desires of Bulgarian nationalists.  
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 251) 
However, as economic problems and external pressure for change arose in 
the latter half of the 1980s, the communists could not develop an adequate response  
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 251-2).  The July Concept recognized the need for 
reforms, but it changed little in actuality (Bell, 1997, p. 257).  Similarly, the communist 
endorsement of perestroika and glasnost during the same year also created no long-term 
changes (Curtis, 1993a, p. 183-4).  Hardliner control kept reform movements, both inside 
and outside the party organization, from presenting significant forces for political change. 
Although other communists absorbed some the aging Zhivkov’s responsibilities during 
this period, he and the inner circle of communist hardliners remained able to dissipate the 
power of inter-party rivals, (Curtis, 1993a, p. 183) as evidenced by the dismissal of a 
disfavored Politburo member and the secretary of the Central Committee in July 1988 
(Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 252). 
Meanwhile, elite opposition groups remained absent from the political 
environment during the early and mid-1980s.  The communist party co-opted vocal 
intellectuals, thus curbing the growth of an independent elite dissident movement.  (Bell, 
1997, p. 357)  However, in the wake of increased repression of the Turkish-Muslim 
minority in Bulgaria, increased elite dissent emerged from the opposition.  In the summer 
of 1989, Bulgarian intellectuals petitioned the government to restore the basic rights of 
the country’s minorities.  (Curtis, 1993a, p. 184) 
Amidst the rising undercurrent of opposition, the hardliners remained 
generally unwilling to change.  However, in late October 1989, Zhivkov did admit to the 
failure of the July Concept and Decree No. 56 to create sufficient political openings and 
economic growth (Curtis, 1993a, p. 185).  Then, on 10 November 1989, the Central 
Committee announced Zhivkov’s resignation.  Soon it became apparent that reform-
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oriented party members, who recognized that only political change could jumpstart 
economic recovery, had forced his resignation.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 253) 
 Even after the departure of Zhivkov, the communists remained the 
dominant elites and carefully directed Bulgaria towards democratization.  Under the 
direction of the Politburo and, subsequently, Mladenov, the Bulgarian government 
initiated a series of political reforms, culminating in the scheduling of elections.  These 
reforms proved essential to the retention of power by the renamed Bulgarian Socialist 
Party.  (Curtis, 1993a, pp. 185-6)  The round-table talks with the elite representatives of 
the opposition parties served to speed some of these reforms and also legitimized the 
former communists as valid post-Zhivkov actors (Daskalov, 1998, p. 10).  Following the 
elections in early summer 1990, the opposition elites again played an important role in 
securing the presidency for Zhelev through negotiations with the majority Bulgarian 
Socialist Party (Curtis, 1993a, p. 187). 
Overall, the communists headed the most significant elite institutions in 
Bulgaria.  Before the Zhivkov’s ouster, the hardliners dominated the Bulgarian 
Communist Party, and afterwards the reformers moved to the forefront with the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party.  Opposition elites did not become important actors until early 
1990 when they were able to negotiate with the Socialists for additional political 
concessions. 
b. Mass-Based Institutions 
Due to the prominence of the communist party, mass-based institutions 
did not play a major role in the Bulgarian transition.  Nevertheless, the number of mass-
based organizations increased as the transition approached. 
The rise of opposition mass-based institutions coincided with the 
deterioration of the Bulgarian economy and political changes in the rest of the Soviet bloc 
(Curtis, 1993a, p. 199).  An unofficial human rights organization emerged in Bulgaria in 
1988, and other grassroots institutions arose soon after.  By the spring of 1989, these 
organizations included Podkrepa, an independent trade union, and Ecoglasnost, an 
environmental party.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, p. 252)  Meanwhile, between 
1987 and 1989, the membership of the Communist Youth League of Bulgaria declined by 
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30 percent, although the overall membership in the Bulgarian Communist Party remained 
remarkably high into the 1980s, with one in every nine Bulgarians registered as party 
members (Curtis, 1993a, pp. 205, 197). 
Despite government attempts to eradicate opposition mass-based 
institutions, several such groups had established a secure foothold in Bulgaria by the 
summer of 1989 (Curtis, 1993a, p. 211).  A few political parties, including the Social 
Democrats and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, reemerged under the Zhivkov 
regime.  In addition, in May 1989 several thousand Turkish-Muslim Bulgarians 
demonstrated against the communists in response to increased government pressure on 
minorities in the late 1980s.  (Bell, 1997, pp. 358)  In late October and early November, 
meetings of human rights and environmental organizations prompted mass anti-
government demonstrations in Sofia (Curtis, 1993a, pp. 184-5).  Nevertheless, as the 
flight of Turkish-Muslims to Turkey demonstrated, mass-based institutions did not 
acquire sufficient support or power to force negotiations with the communists. 
The major growth in mass-based organizations took place after the 
Bulgarian Communist Party dismissed Zhivkov.  The Union of Democratic Forces was 
the primary post-Zhivkov opposition movement, and it incorporated several dissident 
organizations, including Ecoglasnost and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union.  
Although the member groups within the Union of Democratic Forces agreed on several 
important political goals, they continued to focus their efforts on disjointed issue areas, 
which deprived the party of much of its potential political influence.  (Curtis, 1993a, pp. 
199-200)  Nevertheless, the leaders of the Union did advance their party’s position during 
the round-table talks with Bulgarian Socialist Party (Daskalov, 1998, p. 10). 
The two other main mass-based organizations in post-Zhivkov Bulgaria 
were the Movement for Rights and Freedoms and the Bulgarian Socialist Party.  The 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms represented the Turkish-Muslim minority in 
Bulgaria and, due to lingering nationalist sentiment in Bulgaria, failed to gain a seat at the 
round-table talks (Curtis, 1993a, p. 206).  Representing the opposite extreme, the 
Bulgarian Socialist Party was very successful.  Under new leadership but retaining the 
basic structure and resources of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the socialists 
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campaigned as defenders of the weak and as protectors of the Bulgarian nationalism  
(Daskalov, 1998, p. 12).  Moreover, because the Bulgarian Communist Party had begun 
as an indigenous Bulgarian movement in the late nineteenth century, its socialist 
successor did not face the immediate rejection that plagued many other post-transition, 
Soviet-bloc communist parties (Curtis, 1993a, p. 186). 
Thus, although some mass-based institutions did arise in Bulgaria prior to 
the ouster of Zhivkov, they remained weak and fragmented.  When significant opposition 
parties finally coalesced in late 1989 and early 1990, they still did not enjoy the popular 
support or resource base of the reformed communist-socialist party. 
c. External Institutions 
Bulgaria’s communists came under increasing external pressure to 
institute political changes during the late 1980s.  Unsurprisingly, the greatest influences 
came from the Soviet Union and the West. 
The turning point in Bulgarian-Soviet relations occurred in 1985 when the 
Soviet Union began political and economic reforms under the leadership of Gorbachev.  
The Soviets stressed that the Bulgarian communists had to institute similar changes if 
their traditionally-close relationship was to continue.  (Curtis, 1993b, p. 56)  The Soviets 
used economic pressure, including reductions in oil supplies and subsidies to Bulgaria, to 
force communist hardliners into action.  The result was the July Concept of 1987, which, 
although it did not create long-term changes in Bulgaria, demonstrated the power of 
Soviet influence.  The Soviet Union continued to support reform efforts within Bulgaria, 
as seen by the Soviet embassy’s willingness to continue receiving reformist communists 
dismissed by Zhivkov in the summer of 1988.  (Rothschild and Wingfield, 2000, pp. 251-
2)  Simultaneously, the demonstration effect of reforms and changes throughout the 
Soviet bloc inspired Bulgarian intellectuals to become more vocal in their protests against 
the communist regime (Bell, 1997, p. 358). 
The greatest demonstration of Soviet resolve to force reforms in Bulgaria 
was the Soviet-Bulgarian interaction prior to Zhivkov’s dismissal.  On a return trip from 
China, Mladenov stopped in the Soviet Union and discussed the political environment in 
Bulgaria with Soviet leaders (Bell, 1997, p. 360).  The Soviets approved the inter-party 
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coup desired by reformers within the Bulgarian Communist Party, (Daskalov, 1998, p. 9) 
and Gorbachev viewed the change as appropriate due to Zhivkov’s failure to create more-
than-cosmetic reforms within Bulgaria (Curtis, 1993a, p. 185). 
Pressure for reforms within Bulgaria also came from the countries of the 
West, but it was less influential than that of the Soviet Union.  In the early and mid-
1980s, Bulgaria sought relatively progressive ties with West Germany and France, but 
those links deteriorated as the end of the decade approached.  In 1988, Bulgaria lost its 
attempt to receive membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade due to its 
persecution of Turkish-Muslim Bulgarians.  (Curtis, 1993a, p. 221)  In spite of this 
decision to punish Bulgaria's communists, the West did not reach out to pull Bulgaria 
towards democracy as much as it did for some of the other Soviet bloc countries.  For 
example, the first Western head-of-state visit to communist Bulgaria was the French 
President Mitterrand in early 1989, and the United States only sent an assistant secretary 
of state to talk with the communists before Zhivkov's dismissal (Curtis, 1993a, p. 221).  
Although state interaction with the West was minimal, intellectuals in Bulgaria did 
increase their criticism of the communist regime after the West voiced support for human 
rights through the Helsinki Agreements (Bell, 1997, p. 358).   
  Overall, the Soviet Union was the most influential external institution in 
Bulgaria's transition.  Soviet approval of Zhivkov's ouster was a significant boost to the 
reform elements of the Bulgarian Communist Party.  Although the West made some 
overtures towards pressuring Bulgaria for change, its policies did not notably affect 
Bulgaria's transition except to encourage some elements of the opposition to take greater 
action against the communists. 
3. Reassessing Bulgaria's Mode of Transition 
Building on the knowledge of the roles of various political institutions in 
Bulgaria’s transition, this section reassess Karl and Schmitter’s initial characterization of 
the country’s mode of transition.  Karl and Schmitter locate Bulgaria’s transition within 
the imposition category, noting that violence occurred during anti-Zhivkov popular 
protests and that incumbent elites maintained control in the post-transition environment 
(1991, pp. 276-7).  This work generally agrees with Karl and Schmitter’s placement of 
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Bulgaria’s mode of transition, but it argues against the importance of the popular 
demonstrations. 
Clearly, Bulgaria’s transition belongs in the imposition category.  This “palace 
coup” was a preemptive move by elite communist reformers to ensure their political 
survival (Munck and Leff, 1999, p. 13).  The decision of the Central Committee to 
remove their own hardliner leader, Zhivkov, demonstrated a forced change from within 
the party.  Certainly, reformers’ actions took into account the political events throughout 
the Soviet bloc as well as the rise of mass-based institutions in Bulgaria.  However, since 
they acted before violence or negotiations forced them to, the Bulgarian communists 
executed a clear example of transition by imposition. 
Moreover, the continued dominance of communist reformers and their Bulgarian 
Socialist Party in the post-Zhivkov environment showed their grip on power remained 
largely intact.  Although some negotiations took place in early 1990, the Socialists 
spearheaded the majority of changes in Bulgaria’s political system.  Certainly, the 
retention of political strength and popular support by the Socialists adds weight to the 
argument that the communists instituted the transition on their own terms.  Essentially, 
the imposition of change continued well past Zhivkov’s departure. 
While the description of Bulgaria’s transition as one of imposition remains firmly 
agreed upon, the relative importance of opposition institutions is more difficult to 
determine.  As previously mentioned, the communists were aware of growing dissention 
within the country.  Political parties and civil-society organizations had grown 
significantly in 1989, and by the end of October popular protests had begun.  Certainly, 
part of the communists’ strategy was to “open competition so as to forestall a fuller 
popular mobilization that might attenuate their dominance” (Munck and Leff, 1999, p. 
13).  However, the limited scale of the demonstrations and the ability of the communists 
to manipulate the political environment showed that protests were not the controlling 
factor in Bulgaria’s transition.  Indeed, opposition mass-based institutions failed to 
capture the majority of Bulgarian support during the subsequent elections in the summer 
of 1990. 
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In spite of the weakness of the mass-based institutions, their elite leadership did 
help propel democratic changes in post-Zhivkov Bulgaria.  The round-table talks allowed 
the elite opposition to pressure the Socialists and ensured that the Socialists would follow 
through quickly with more democratic reforms.  That the opposition obtained the 
presidency for Zhelev in August of 1990 demonstrated both their growing political 
capacity and the “pattern of elite contestation” that characterized Bulgaria’s early 
democracy  (Munck and Leff, 1999, p. 14). 
Using this interpretation of events, Figure 6 places Bulgaria’s mode of transition 
firmly within the imposition category.  However, it moves its position slightly in  
 
Figure 6. Bulgaria’s Mode of Transition 
After Karl and Schmitter, 1991, p. 276 
comparison to Karl and Schmitter’s location of Bulgaria’s mode of transition in Figure 2.  
Figure 6 retains the location of Bulgaria's mode of transition relative to the x-axis in order 
to reaffirm the primary influence of imposition while acknowledging the pacted aspect of 
the post-Zhivkov round-table talks.  In relation to the y-axis, Figure 6 moves Bulgaria's 
location more towards the elite end of the axis than does Figure 2.  Although this is a 
relatively small shift, it reinforces the minimal influence of mass-based organizations on 
Bulgaria's transition and stresses the predominance of imposition. 
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In terms of the z-axis, Figure 6 recognizes the importance of Soviet approval for 
the imposition in Bulgaria.  While external institutions aided in creating the political 
space in which the transition could occur, the Soviet state as an institution also influenced 
the course of the transition.  For this reason, Figure 6 places Bulgaria's mode of transition 
closer to the external end of the z-axis and higher than any of the other case study 
transitions.  Nevertheless, Bulgaria's location remains closer to the internal extreme of the 
axis than to the external extreme.  This denotes the key role of Bulgaria's communists in 
devising and implementing the transition.  Overall, Figure 6 generally supports Karl and 
Schmitter's characterization of Bulgaria's mode of transition as one of imposition. 
E. LESSONS FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
The previous analysis of the transitions in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and 
Bulgaria reveals several important insights into transitions.  Even though this study 
interweaves the transitional lessons through the comparisons of the Soviet bloc and Cuba 
found in the following chapters, this section provides a concise overview of these lessons 
to highlight the value of the case studies. 
First, the case studies confirm that political institutions play a crucial role in 
regime transitions.  In each of the case studies, the interaction of political institutions was 
sufficient to explain both the sequence of events during the transition and the mode of 
transition.  No transitional outcomes remain unexplained by this method of analysis.  
Thus, as initially assumed, institutional environments determine the courses and results of 
regime transitions. 
Second, although internal and external institutions both perform necessary 
functions in transitions to democracy in Soviet-style communist states, internal 
institutions played a more influential role in the case study transitions.  In each case 
study, changes in the external institutional environment created the necessary conditions 
for a transition away from authoritarianism.  The common external change among all the 
case studies was the decision of the Soviet Union to refrain from ensuring the survival of 
communism in Central Europe.  Despite this change, the case study countries’ internal 
institutional environments still required adjustment before a transition to democracy was 
possible.  In essence, external institutional changes created additional space for internal 
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ones.  Ultimately, while external institutions play a necessary role in transitions away 
from Soviet-style communism, internal institutions remain the more influential 
institutions in these transitions and largely determine the country’s mode of transition. 
Third, institutional changes occur at varying speeds.  From the case studies, 
Poland and Romania represent two extremes of transitional rapidity.  In Poland, the first 
substantial indications of change began almost a decade before the transition, but they did 
not happen in Romania until only a few months prior to its transition.  This demonstrates 
that changes in a country’s institutional environment can occur gradually or suddenly.  
Essentially, the specific strength and combination of the institutions affecting each 
country control the rate of its transition. 
Overall, these three insights highlight the most fundamental lessons derived from 
the analysis of the case studies.  These lessons appear in greater detail both explicitly and 
implicitly in the subsequent comparisons between the case studies and Cuba, and they 




















IV. CUBA’S INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
Focusing on this study’s target country, this chapter analyzes Cuba’s institutional 
environment.  It begins by reviewing the institutions both within and outside of Cuba that 
are shaping Cuba’s political environment and could contribute to the island’s transition 
through their strengths or weaknesses.  Next, this chapter compares Cuba’s institutional 
environment with those of the case study countries.  Ultimately, analyzing Cuba’s 
institutional environment and comparing it to the institutional environments in Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria during their transitions provide the necessary information 
for drawing conclusions concerning the most likely characteristics of Cuba’s next 
transition in Chapter V. 
This chapter includes four main sections.  The first three sections discuss the 
political institutions affecting Cuba and, like the previous chapter, focus on elite, mass-
based, and external institutions.  Prominent individual political institutions as well as 
groupings of less-influential institutions appear as subsections within each broad class of 
institutions.  Based on the aforementioned sections, the fourth main section compares 
Cuba’s institutional environment with those of the Soviet bloc countries throughout their 
transitions towards democracy. 
A. ELITE INSTITUTIONS 
Elite institutions remain the dominant political actors within Cuba.  
Unsurprisingly, Cuba’s primary elite institutions are its communist party and its security 
forces, including both the military and the internal security forces.  A third and less-
influential elite institution is the intellectual community.  Although some dissent exists 
among this institution, it clearly has not risen to a level that cannot be controlled by the 
state apparatuses. 
1. The Communist Party 
The Partido Comunista de Cuba, or Cuban Communist Party, is the single official 
party in Cuba and plays an important role in shaping Cuba's political environment.  Like 
many of the other state institutions, the party responds primarily to Fidel Castro and his 
inner circle.  In 1965, Castro reshaped the party to meet his own political needs, making 
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it essentially a front organization for Cuba’s revolutionary political elites.  Generally, 
Castro has not been a strong supporter of traditional party structure; rather, he has used 
the party as a policy tool and as a source of legitimacy.  (Radu, 1995, pp. 91-2)   
Despite the political strength of Fidelista hardliners within the party structure, the 
voice of communist reformers has been heard more often in recent years.  This has led to 
contradictions in the statements made by Cuban officials.  For example, reformers 
suggest that Cuba is heading towards a mixed economy while hardliners maintain that 
socialism will continue to be Cuba’s permanent economic model.  (Suchlicki, 2000, p. 
123)  Similarly, some disagreement exists within the party concerning the possible use of 
violence to maintain communist power.  At an extreme, party members with intense 
ideological commitments, including many within the internal security service, favor such 
use of force.  However, a significant section of more reform-oriented members of the 
party oppose a forceful continuation of the regime.  In reality, it is difficult to determine 
the degree of backing for the use of violence against the populace because some party 
members who have affirmed their support may be doing so only to avoid party retribution 
but would not agree to such action in the event it was actually contemplated.  
(Betancourt, 1997, pp. 10-1) 
The presence of some reformers within the Cuban Communist Party does not 
necessarily indicate that their viewpoint either is being accepted by hardliners or is 
forcing hardliners to compromise.  In the past the party has consistently purged itself of 
members who wish to introduce attempts at liberalization or who challenge the 
dominance of the Castro hardliners.  Many times, the dismissals have been justified as 
measures to rid the Cuban Communist Party of corruption rather than as assaults against 
rival political viewpoints.  Furthermore, most of the replacements brought into the 
communist hierarchy have been younger and, thus, lack any type of independent political 
base.  (Radu, 1995, pp. 92-3)  This systematic purging of reform elements within the 
party has allowed the hardliner elements to retain an effective monopoly on party control. 
In addition to ridding itself of internal challengers, the Cuban Communist Party is 
working to prepare a new leadership to carry on the revolution after Castro’s death 
(Smith, 1996, pp. 108-9).  In 1997, the Fifth Party Congress confirmed Raúl Castro as the 
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eventual successor to his older brother.  During the congress, the younger Castro placed 
more hard-line communists in key party positions.  Moreover, he announced reductions 
in the size of the party’s Central Committee and Political Bureau, thus consolidating the 
power of the hardliners within Cuba.  (Suchlicki, 2000, pp. 129-30)  Based on Raúl’s 
actions and rhetoric, it is clear that the party continues to see reformers within its ranks as 
threats to the regime (Betancourt, 1997, p. 19).  In terms of his own political position, 
Raúl appears to be in the center-right of the party’s membership, in support of hard-line 
political and security issues while in favor of limited economic reforms (Gonzalez, 
1996a, pp. 38-41).    
Overall, hardliners continue to dominate the Cuban Communist Party.  Some 
reform elements may be present within the party, but they currently pose a minimal threat 
to regime continuation (Gonzalez, 1996b, p. 4).   
2. The Security Forces 
Cuba’s security forces form the island’s dominant institutions.  The Cuban 
military, or Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias, and the internal security service are the 
two main security organizations in Cuba. 
The Cuban armed forces were the first major revolutionary institution in Cuba.  
Their tradition of civic soldiering and their ability to avoid using violence against Cuban 
citizens has enabled them to maintain strong popular support (Walker, 1996b, p. 2).  
Since the early 1990s, the Cuban armed forces have become increasing involved in the 
Cuban economy and, as a result, have become a more powerful institution (Radu, 1995, 
p. 99).  Today, the military controls the following organizations in Cuba: the Ministry of 
Sugar Industry; the National Institute of State Reserves; the Ministry of Fisheries and 
Merchant Marine; the Ministry of Transport and Ports; the Cuban Civil Aviation 
Corporation; the Ministry of Information, Technology, and Communications; the 
Industrial Military Union; the Ideological Department of the Central Committee; the 
Ministry of the Interior; and several business outfits in the banking, tourism, shipping, 
land development, and agriculture sectors (Demarest, 2001, pp. 58-9; Walker, 1996a, p. 
68).  The growing role of the Cuban armed forces in the economy have led both to a 
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diminution of their fighting capability and professionalism and to an increase in their 
politicization (Millett, 1996, p. 147). 
In terms of loyalty, the Cuban military continues to support the Castro elite.  
Furthermore, communist hardliners have worked to ensure that the military remains 
subservient to them.  The 1989 execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa for involvement 
with the drug trade appeared more as an attempt to eliminate pro-Soviet, pro-reform 
tendencies within some sectors of the military than as a legitimate anti-corruption effort 
(Radu, 1995, p. 96).  For the most part, the general officer corps within all of the services 
remains loyal to the regime although greater dissention appears to exist within the lower 
ranks of the military (Radu, 1995, p. 102).  Higher-ranking officers tend to benefit most 
from the military’s involvement in the management of the economy while those lower-
ranking officers lacking in business skills see the changes as threatening their traditional 
avenues of promotion.  For ideological and institutional reasons, the Cuban military 
generally favors limited economic reforms, but it does not support a complete transition 
to a market economy.  (Gonzalez, 1996a, pp. 46-7)  For similar reasons, the military also 
desires to avoid using force against the Cuban population although it remains unclear 
whether or not it would do so if so ordered (Demarest, 2001, pp. 59-60; Gonzalez, 1996a, 
pp. 47-8; Radu, 1995, p. 102).  Overall, the Cuban armed forces currently have little to 
gain by abandoning the regime and are content with the choice of Raúl Castro as 
successor (Gonzalez and Nuccio, 1999, p. 10).   
Cuba’s internal security service, a part of the Ministry of the Interior, forms the 
second main security institution in the country.  Besides its intelligence-gathering 
functions, the primary role of the internal security apparatuses remains defense against 
domestic opposition and subversion.  Units within the Ministry of the Interior with anti-
dissident functions include the Border Guard Troops, the Rapid Reaction Brigades, and 
the elite Special Troops.  (Gonzalez, 1996a, p. 48)  Indeed, the internal security services 
have infiltrated and eliminated dissident organizations on the island, have prevented the 
emergence of any robust civilian opposition, and have used force against the population, 
such as during popular riots in Havana in 1994 (Suchlicki, 2000, p. 132; Gonzalez, 
1996a, p. 48). 
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Despite the difference in functions between the internal security forces and the 
military, the institutional separation between the two has diminished since 1989.  In 1989, 
the Cuban government placed the Ministry of the Interior under the control of the Cuban 
armed forces and replaced the leaders of the ministry with military personnel (Walker, 
1996b, p. 2).  Although the regime justified the changes in the internal security services 
as an anti-corruption measure, the change may also have been prompted by the desire of 
Cuban hardliners to avoid later conflicts between the internal security apparatus and the 
military (Walker, 1996b, p. 2; Suchlicki, 2000, p. 132).  Despite the co-option of the 
Ministry of the Interior by the armed forces, the former still functions as the primary 
defender of the communist regime.  Institutionally, the internal security forces support the 
civilian hardliners even though some see limited economic reforms as beneficial.  
Moreover, due to the past abuses perpetrated by the internal security forces, a regime 
change threatens them even more so than it does the military.  (Gonzalez, 1996a, pp. 48-
9) 
Overall, the security forces in Cuba appear committed and subordinated to the 
civilian authorities.  Although both the military and the internal security forces support 
the communist regime, the latter appear to be more firmly embedded in hard-line doctrine 
and action than the former. 
3. The Intellectual Community  
The intellectual community forms a third elite institution in Cuba.  Although the 
Cuban government gives its intellectuals some degree of academic freedom, a strong, 
independent intellectual opposition still does not exist in Cuba. 
Much of Cuba’s intellectual community resides in Cuba’s institutions of higher 
learning.  Cuban professors claim to enjoy complete academic freedom as well as a high 
level of respect (Lawrence, 2000a, p. A48).  In addition, since the mid-1990s, 
intellectuals have been able to make use of important external resources, such as the 
Internet.  Internet access on university campuses is free and open, even though public 
Internet access is closely monitored and difficult to obtain (Lawrence, 2000a, p. A47; 
Demarest, 2001, p. 61).  Although the government allows differing viewpoints to be 
taught and debated within its universities, it does not necessarily agree with them.  In 
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practice, it even allows criticism of Cuban society as long as intellectuals do not blame 
the problems on the communist regime or the revolution.  (Lawrence, 2000a, p. A48) 
Due to implicit threats from the Cuban regime, many intellectuals remain hesitant 
to publicly comment on the government.  Much of the intellectual community’s hesitancy 
to denounce problems within Cuba or promote reforms is due to the relationship between 
it and the government.  The government still controls academic travel and contacts with 
foreign intellectual communities.  (Lawrence, 2000a, pp. A46, A48)  Since a 
professorship and its benefits are much coveted in Cuba, intellectuals do not want to 
jeopardize their positions by pursuing political action (Lawrence, 2000b, p. A47).   
Overall, despite the academic freedom available to Cuba’s intellectual elite, the 
group generally confines its comments to the classroom.  Due to the tight government 
control of career progression within the intellectual community, this sector of elites 
remains unwilling to jeopardize its status through political action.  
B. MASS-BASED INSTITUTIONS 
Mass-based organizations in Cuba currently have varying degrees of effect on the 
political environment on the island.  The most prominent and powerful mass-based 
organizations are religious ones, and the Roman Catholic Church dominates this group.  
Secular organizations also abound although the majority of these institutions maintains 
links with the communist regime.  The final type of mass-based institutions, the dissident 
organizations, faces significant government harassment and lacks substantial popular 
support; thus, they cannot be considered strong political institutions. 
1. Religious Organizations 
Despite past restrictions, religious organizations have become a stronger influence 
in Cuba in recent years.  These organizations include the Roman Catholic Church, 
Protestant institutions, and Afro-Cuban religious affiliations. 
The Roman Catholic Church is Cuba’s primary civil-society actor.  After the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc, Marxist-Leninist “religion” evaporated and the communists 
increased their religious toleration in an attempt to attract more Cubans to the communist 
party.  However, many Cubans found their new religion in Catholicism, not in Cuban 
socialism.  (Gonzalez, 1996a, p. 54-5)  Moreover, the tendency of Cubans to seek refuge 
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in spirituality during times of crisis, which certainly have been evident in post-Soviet 
Cuba, has amplified the ranks of the Church’s faithful (Dilla, 1999, p. 33).  Today, the 
Catholic Church has the most popular support of any mass-based institution in Cuba.  
(Gonzalez, 1996a, pp. 54)  
The Roman Catholic Church operates independently of the communist regime and 
has begun to challenge some of the government’s policies (Gonzalez, 1996a, p. 54).  
Specifically, the Church supports a free-market economy, multiparty democracy, and a 
return to “traditional values of the Church” (Dilla, 1999, p. 33).  Furthermore, priests 
often promote this political agenda from the pulpit in an attempt to reorient the political 
mindset within Cuba, and laymen bolster this promotion by conducting home-study 
programs focusing on the fundamentals of democracy.  In addition, the Church sponsors 
an important non-governmental organization, Caritas, that has successfully bargained 
with the regime for greater access to foreign humanitarian assistance.   (Gonzalez, 1996a, 
pp. 55-6)  Overall, these operations aid the Roman Catholic Church in being the most 
active and influential mass-based institution in Cuba. 
Although lacking in the organizational hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church, 
Cuba’s Protestant churches have also become more active in the last decade.  The 
stimulants of growth in Protestant organizations have been the same as those for the 
Catholic Church.  (Gonzalez, 1996a, p. 56)  In June 1998, a popular rally in Havana 
demonstrated the growing influence of Protestantism in Cuba.  In response to the Pope’s 
mass held early in the year, 100,000 Cuban Protestants gathered in the capital to show an 
alternative to Catholicism.  Interestingly, the government provided transportation for this 
rally and broadcast it on television, and even Castro attended the function.  (Jeffrey, 
1999, p. 1190) 
The political ability of Cuba’s Protestant churches has grown slowly in recent 
years.  While Protestants promote political viewpoints similar to those espoused by 
Catholics, they traditionally have not had as much success in coordinating their actions 
(Dilla, 1999, p. 33; Gonzalez, 1996a, p. 58).  However, the Cuban Council of Churches is 
trying to change this by encouraging cooperation among Protestant congregations and 
organizations.  The Council supports at least two significant non-governmental 
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organizations on the island, the Martin Luther King Center and the Center of Reflection 
and Dialogue.  These organizations carry out community education and development 
projects and spread their message through progressive religious publications.  (Dilla, 
1999, p. 33)  However, some church leaders question the loyalty of Cuba’s Protestants 
and worry that Cubans see the churches as aid distributors more than a source of spiritual 
or political hope (Jeffrey, 1999, p. 1191).  If true, this revelation weakens any political 
impact that Protestant organizations are likely to have in the near-term future.  Thus, 
despite advances in membership and organizational capacity, Cuba’s Protestant churches 
do not command as much political influence as the Roman Catholic Church. 
The final group of religions in Cuba is based on Afro-Cuban beliefs.  Afro-Cuban 
religions, including Santería, Palo Monte, and Abaku, remain the least influential of all 
religious groups in Cuba.  Although these religions successfully escaped state efforts to 
dismantle them during the early waves of anti-religion campaigns, they have failed to 
mobilize politically in the last decade.  In fact, the government began efforts in the early 
1990s to co-opt the Afro-Cuban religions in an attempt to stymie political development 
within them, to gain support for the regime, and to undermine the growing Catholic 
Church.  (Gonzalez, 1996a, p. 57)  These efforts proved successful, and now informants 
within many Afro-Cuban congregations serve to alert the regime to possible dissidents 
(Gonzalez, 1996a, p. 58).  Overall, despite the ability of the Afro-Cuban religions to 
attract followers, they currently lack the cooperation and organizational hierarchy 
necessary to become an influential political institution (Dilla, 1999, p. 33). 
Ultimately, religious organizations form the core of mass-based institutions in 
Cuba.  Although the religions vary in their political activity, none has developed its 
political activities as much as the Roman Catholic Church. 
2. Secular Organizations 
A second type of mass-based institution appears in the Cuban non-religious social 
organizations and in the secular non-governmental organizations.  The majority of these 
institutions maintains some affiliation with the government and therefore lacks an 
independent political voice.  Truly non-governmental organizations remain scarce and, 
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having attracted negative attention from the communists, do not constitute an effective 
political opposition. 
Social organization by the state has been a part of Cuban life throughout the 
revolution.  Typically, many local and national social organizations served as 
mechanisms through which the communist party could disseminate its ideas and control 
the population.  The largest state-organized institutions include the Committees for 
Defense of the Revolution, the Federation of Cuban Women, and the Union of Cuban 
Workers.  Smaller institutions include student organizations, small peasant groups, and 
cultural and sports associations.  (Dilla, 1999, p. 32)  In total, over 2,000 such mass-based 
groups maintain official registrations with the Cuban government (Gonzalez, 1996a, p. 
59).  Even so, these organizations have declined in importance among the general 
population in recent years.  The active membership of auxiliary organizations has 
dropped significantly as has popular interest in once-strong community activities, such as 
block meetings and vigilante patrols.  (Radu, 1995, p. 106) 
Regardless of the quantity of state-affiliated mass-based institutions in Cuba, the 
political capacity of the majority of these groups remains largely inconsequential.  
Publicly, these organizations support the revolutionary rhetoric.  However, within the 
Cuban decision-making structure these institutions do enjoy some autonomy to express 
and promote their own opinions and agendas.  They often develop independent positions 
on issues relating to their organization and represent their viewpoints in discussions with 
the government.  Nevertheless, the open nature of these organizations resides primarily 
within each institution’s framework and not in the framework of institution-government 
interaction.  (Dilla, 1999, pp. 32-3) 
Labor unions and other professional organizations in Cuba provide good 
examples of organizations with progressive internal structures.  These institutions often 
have democratically elected leaderships and involve the organizational masses in routine 
policy-making.  As early as 1994, the economic influence of these mass-based 
institutions became evident when labor unions succeeded in pressuring the government to 
abandon plans for an income tax.  (Dilla, 1999, p. 32-3)  The economic persuasion held 
by these institutions is not especially surprising when one considers that the sudden 
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growth in such organizations after 1989 resulted from the Cuban government’s decision 
to shift much of its post-Soviet-aid social and economic burden to these mass-based 
groups (Gonzalez, 1996a, p. 59).  Despite these advances, state-affiliated mass-based 
organizations have not challenged the communist regime politically.  On the contrary, 
these institutions still support key political tenets of the revolution, such as the socialist 
system, economic equality, and anti-imperialism.  (Dilla, 1999, pp. 32-3)  If the more 
independent development of these organizations in the last decade represents an increase 
in regime opposition, it certainly must be characterized as loyal opposition. 
Due to the close ties between most non-religious social organizations and the 
Cuban state, the majority of these institutions cannot be accurately described as non-
governmental organizations.  Nevertheless, a few secular, independent mass-based 
organizations do exist in Cuba.  Perhaps the best examples of independent non-
governmental organizations in Cuba are the Independent Society of Cuban Economists 
and the Independent Press Bureau.  The Cuban government has denied these groups 
official non-governmental organization status, and this fact suggests that these 
institutions have not, like so many other social organizations on the island, been co-opted 
by the communists.  (Gonzalez, 1996a, pp. 60-1)  The local political ability of these 
institutions still remains low, and the Cuban government has actively attacked other non-
governmental organizations, such as the Concilio Cubano, that it considered a threat to 
the revolution (Gonzalez and Szayna, 1998, p. 30).  Thus, an independent network of 
non-governmental organizations remains weak and only in its formative stages in Cuba. 
Overall, state-affiliated organizations dominate Cuba’s mass-based social 
institutions.  Government control of these organizations has allowed the communists to 
block the potential political influence of these groups.  True non-governmental 
organizations have not established a firm footing in Cuba and face strong government 
opposition.  Ultimately, this characterization of Cuba’s secular social environment 
suggests that Cuban civil society remains in its earliest stages and faces significant 
challenges regarding its future progression (Gonzalez and Szayna, 1998, p. 35). 
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3. Dissident Organizations 
Dissident groups with a specifically political focus form a third type of mass-
based institution in Cuba.  Although these groups have attracted some international 
attention, they remain a weak political force within Cuba due to constant government 
action against them and their own inability to mobilize significant popular support. 
In the absence of opposition political parties, dissident organizations fulfill a 
unique role of political resistance to the Cuban government.  While religious groups and 
non-governmental organizations support varying degrees of political action against the 
communists, the dissident organizations distinguish themselves because their sole raison 
d’être is political in nature.  These institutions challenge the restrictive political 
environment in Cuba most commonly through campaigns to increase the regime’s respect 
for human rights on the island. 
Because of their purely political focus, dissident organizations in Cuba remain 
scarce and lack a significant political base and influence (“The Americas…,” 2000, p. 
38).  The popular support for these institutions remains limited since most Cubans do not 
know about these organizations and, having developed a sense of political apathy under 
communist rule, do not care to participate in political change (Radu, 2000, pp. 11, 20).  
Moreover, although the Cuban government allows some individual criticism of its 
policies, it has successfully curtailed the growth of organizations that wish to increase 
their popular support or mount public challenges to the regime.  Recently, the 
communists have renewed the crackdown on political dissent by using informants to help 
the regime target leaders of dissident organizations for continual government harassment.  
(“The Americas…,” 2000, p. 38) 
Despite the government’s infiltration of and crackdown against most dissident 
groups (“The Americas…,” 2000, p. 38), these mass-based organizations continue to 
make minor inroads against the communists.  For example, during an Ibero-American 
summit in Cuba in late 1999, Castro succumbed to foreign pressure and allowed visiting 
dignitaries from through Latin America, Spain, and Portugal to meet with leaders of 
prominent dissident organizations.  Although these institutions gained no concrete 
concessions from the government, they did cause some embarrassment for Castro and his 
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party.  (Szulc, 1999, pp. 6-10)  Specific dissident organizations have not attained any 
higher levels of success.  Although a forty-day hunger strike in the summer of 1999 by 
the Tamarindo 34 Human Rights group sparked similar protests throughout the island and 
attracted support from a few thousand Cubans, it failed to achieve its goal of forcing the 
government to release all political prisoners and recognize basic human rights.  
(Martinez, 1999, p. 70) 
Ultimately, the strength of the Cuban government prevents dissident organizations 
from expanding.  Popular loyalty to Castro combines with widespread political 
resignation to produce sentiments such as the following: “Get angry? Why? There’s no 
point to getting angry.  You can’t do anything about it” (Martinez, 1999, p. 71).  As long 
as this context continues, dissident institutions in Cuba will likely remain small, 
fragmented, and politically weak. 
C. EXTERNAL INSTITUTIONS 
A wide array of external institutions attempts to influence Cuba’s political 
environment.  These include other states, non-governmental organizations, and even 
inter-governmental organizations.  Although many external institutions have pressured 
the communist regime, none has achieved noteworthy success in actually forcing the 
Cuban government to change. 
1. Other States 
Through individual actions, other states seek to influence and change the Cuban 
government.  The United States maintains the most hard-line stance against the 
communist regime.  Many European and Latin American countries pursue a moderate 
relationship with Cuba through economic engagement.  Other countries, such as China, 
Vietnam, and Venezuela, openly cooperate economically and politically with Cuba.  
Despite Cuba’s contact with a wide range of regime types, it has not changed its own 
political foundations as a result. 
Historically, the United States has played a prominent role in attempting to shape 
Cuba’s political environment.  Today, the United States continues as the dominant source 
of anti-Castro foreign pressure.  In the last decade, the United States, hoping to speed 
democratization on the island, has acted to increase pressure on Cuban communists.  
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Much of this pressure has come in the form of Congressional laws intended to increase 
the economic woes for the Cuban government.   
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 tightened the United States’ embargo against 
Cuba by creating negative consequences for United States firms whose foreign 
subsidiaries traded with Cuba (Domínguez, 1996, p. 303).  In 1996, President William 
Clinton signed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which further tightened 
the embargo.  This act removed the president’s prerogative over the embargo, requiring 
an act of Congress to change it.  Furthermore, the legislation allows United States citizens 
to pursue legal action against foreign entities that deal in confiscated United States 
property and denies entry into the United States to any party involved in such activity.  
(Purcell, 1998, p. 48)  However, President George Bush, recognizing the strong foreign 
criticism of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, recently followed the lead 
of his predecessor in suspending the section of the bill that allows prosecution of 
foreigners (Marquis, 2001, p. 1).  Still, the United States refuses to deal economically or 
politically with the Castro regime. 
Despite the United States’ strong stance against Cuba’s communists, many other 
states, while supporting democratization in Cuba, do not share the same affinity for harsh 
measures against the Cuban state.  For example, during the 1993 Ibero-American 
Summit, all of the heads of the Spanish-speaking Latin American countries, Brazil, 
Spain, and Portugal approved a resolution that implicitly rejected the concept of the 
United States’ unilateral embargo and called for its termination (Domínguez, 1996, p. 
304).  A similarly harsh response followed the United States’ passage of the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.  Important allies and trading partners, including 
Canada, Mexico, and many European countries, voiced disapproval of the legislation.  
Canada even responded with the Godfrey-Milikin Act, which duplicated the most 
controversial aspects of the United States law and authorized Canadian citizens to exact 
legal restitution from United States citizens for trafficking in confiscated Canadian 
property.  (Richardson and Weiss, 1997, p. 1)   
Mexico historically has maintained fairly close ties with Cuba, and in a recent 
interview, Jorge Castañeda, Mexico’s foreign minister, reaffirmed that Mexico will 
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continue its relationship with the island.  Although Mexico still disagrees with the United 
States’ embargo against Cuba, under President Vicente Fox Mexico has pledged to press 
Cuba for greater respect of human rights and for democratization.  (Castañeda, 2001, pp. 
5-6)  On the other hand, efforts to promote respect for human rights have not 
accompanied Venezuela’s increasingly close ties with Cuba.  In late 2000, Venezuela 
agreed to help alleviate Cuba’s economic problems with supplies of subsidized oil (“The 
Ambitions…,” 2000, p. 38).  Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez’s friendly ties with 
Cuba extend to the political arena as well; Venezuela voted against a resolution by the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights to condemn Cuba on its human rights 
situation (“Vote…,” 2000, p. 3).  Some extra-regional states also maintain a position of 
solidarity with Cuba; these include countries with a past or present communist 
orientation, such as Russia, China, and Vietnam, and other Third World nations, such as 
Kenya (Cuba, 2000, p. 7). 
  Despite the large amount of economic, political, and human rights pressure 
applied to Cuba by other states, these measures have not produced significant changes in 
Cuba.  For example, even though Cuba has changed its methods of repression, it has not 
lessened its anti-subversion campaign.  In an attempt to avoid pressure from other states 
on the human rights situation on the island, the regime abandoned the long prison 
sentences previously awarded to dissidents and replaced them with a program of constant 
harassment based on continual short-term detentions (“The Americas…,” 2000, p. 38).  
In essence, Cuba has noticed the human rights pressure from other states, but it has not 
fundamentally improved its respect for human rights.   
In economic terms, the unilateral embargo has been unsuccessful in isolating the 
communists or producing a transition.  Even though the Cuban government admitted that 
the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act did slow growth on the island (Cuba, 
2000, p. 8), foreign investments and aid have continued to allow Cuba to weather the loss 
of Soviet aid that occurred in the early 1990s (Grogg, 2001, pp. 2-3).  Ultimately, Cuba 
has not initiated significant political changes in response to the actions of other states in 
the last decade. 
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2. Non-Governmental Organizations 
In addition to other states, non-governmental organizations also attempt to shape 
the political environment in Cuba.  These institutions include groups with a political 
focus, establishments with business interests, and organizations devoted to protecting 
human rights.  Due to the restricted access to Cuba, most of these organizations exert 
their influence indirectly by pressuring other states or inter-governmental organizations.  
Despite persistent efforts, these institutions have not forced changes within Cuba or 
among its communist leadership.  
Cuban exile groups in the United States may be the most prominent non-
governmental organizations focused on creating change in Cuba.  However, these 
organizations do not form a monolithic bloc; instead they represent a wide range of 
opinions on interaction with the Castro government.  Some extremist groups, such as 
Acción Cubana and Alpha 66, still maintain a militant stance against Cuba’s communists.  
Although direct military action against Castro no longer is as widespread as it once was, 
such groups may have been involved in bombings of Cuba’s tourist sector during 1997.  
(García, 1998, pp. 18, 22; Cuba, 2000, p. 8) 
Among the more moderate exile groups, divisions exist between those who 
oppose engagement with the Cuban government and those who support it.  Champions of 
the first position traditionally have included the Cuban American National Foundation, 
the Junta Patriótica Cubana, and Cuba Independiente y Democrática.  These groups 
support hard-line legislation, such as the Cuban Democracy Act, that restricts the United 
States’ ability to interact with Cuba.  In contrast, institutions that favor dialogue with the 
Castro regime support efforts to increase personal and official interaction with the island.  
These groups include organizations such as the Cuban Democratic Platform and the 
Cuban Committee for Democracy.  (García, 1998, pp. 21-2) 
Moreover, changes and friction within exile organizations in recent years suggest 
that the lobbying potential of these groups may be waning.  Younger Cuban Americans 
tend to support a more liberal position concerning interaction with Cuba than do their 
older, exiled relatives.  Political involvement among this growing sector of the Cuban 
American community has been less widespread, and when these younger people associate 
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with exile groups, they favor organizations that support diplomacy over conflict.  (García, 
1998, p. 23)  Recent developments within the Cuban American National Foundation 
mirror this trend.  Many older, hard-line members of the organization have resigned their 
memberships, claiming that the group’s young leader, Jorge Mas Santos, has softened the 
organization’s opposition to Castro and betrayed the legacy of its founder and Mas 
Santos’s father, Jorge Mas Canosa (Canedy, 2001, pp. 1-3). 
Another, growing group of non-governmental organizations attempting to 
influence public policy in the United States is the business community.   The Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, the Export Council, and the 
National Foreign Trade Council have all echoed United States corporations’ disapproval 
of the embargo against Cuba.  (Richardson and Weiss, 1997, pp. 2-3)  Arguing that 
democracy promotion accompanies the exportation of food and medicine, powerful farm 
lobbies representing grain and fruit growers have pressured the United States for changes 
in its Cuba policy (Magnusson, 2000, p. 56).  The legislative response effectively blocked 
the hopes of these firms by making financing of food and medicine sales to Cuba illegal 
by any public or private government agency, bank, or financial institution.  Furthermore, 
Cuba responded by declaring that it would not consider firms from the United States as 
suppliers until the United States lifts all of its economic restrictions against the island.  
(Grogg, 2001, p. 2)  Denied access to Cuba, business interests in the United States have 
been unable to create significant changes there. 
The final major group of non-governmental organizations with an interest in Cuba 
focuses on human rights issues.  These groups seek to bring attention to the human rights 
abuses perpetrated by the communists and intend to improve the human rights situation 
on the island through external pressure.  A limited number of non-governmental 
organizations attempt to influence the Cuban government in a relatively direct manner.  
The Brothers to the Rescue organization represents this type of group.  Although it is 
known most for its efforts to save balseros in the Straits of Florida, Brothers to the 
Rescue also aims to “promote and support the efforts of the Cuban people to free 
themselves from dictatorship through the use of active nonviolence.”  (“Hermanos…,” 
2001, p. 1)  However, due to the willingness of the Cuban government to thwart activities 
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by these types of organizations, groups such as Brothers to the Rescue have been 
unsuccessful in creating change within Cuba. 
Meanwhile, other non-governmental organizations with a human rights focus 
have pursued change in Cuba through indirect political pressure.  These institutions, such 
as Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch, provide human rights 
information on Cuba to other external institutions in the hopes that this knowledge will 
prompt these organizations to pressure Cuba for change.  For example, the Human Rights 
Watch criticizes the communist regime on a number of fronts.  Primarily, it compares 
Cuba’s actions concerning human rights with the promises the island has made 
concerning the protection of human rights.  The group criticizes Cuba for failing to 
respect the international agreements on human rights that it has signed, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and for failing to fulfill its obligations to respect 
human rights that stem from its incorporation into the United Nations Charter.  Moreover, 
the Human Rights Watch uses specific examples of abuses in Cuba to support its 
findings.  (“Summary…,” 1999, pp. 1-8)  Despite the efforts of groups like the Human 
Rights Watch, Cuba has avoided substantial change in its human rights practices. 
Overall, non-governmental organizations have succeeded in attracting significant 
international attention to Cuba through the use of a wide variety of methods.  Certainly, 
the awareness of Cuba’s human rights situation among other states and inter-
governmental organizations reflects, in part, the efforts of these institutions.  Ultimately, 
though, the efforts of these groups have not created noteworthy changes within Cuba 
through direct or indirect action. 
3. Inter-Governmental Organizations 
A final type of external institution that influences the Cuban political environment 
is the inter-governmental organization.  The United Nations, the Organization of 
American States, and the European Union are three such institutions that have pressured 
the Cuban government to make political changes.  Despite the number of countries that 
these organizations represent, they have been unable to obtain political concessions from 
Cuba. 
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 As the most prominent inter-governmental organization in the world, the United 
Nations has supported Cuba on some issues and chastised the island concerning others.  
On multiple occasions in the last decade, the United Nations General Assembly passed 
resolutions that called for the United States to end its embargo on Cuba.  These 
declarations served as a direct response to the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act by 
the United States in 1992.  (Domínguez, 1996, p. 304)  A similar resolution received the 
support of an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly following the United 
States’ enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Richardson and 
Weiss, 1997, p. 1).   
During this same period of time, the General Assembly began calling on Cuba’s 
communist regime to end its human rights abuses and to increase its respect for specific 
principles of the United Nations Charter, such as the rights to freedom of expression and 
freedom of association (Domínguez, 1996, pp. 304-5).  The denouncement of Cuba’s 
human rights situation has continued since then.  For example, during the spring of 2000 
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights voted to support a resolution that 
condemned the Cuban government for its repression of political dissidents and religious 
groups (“U.N. Rights…,” 2000, p. 1).  Thus, in the last decade, the United Nations 
consistently has supported Cuba’s condemnation of the United States embargo while 
simultaneously criticizing the island for its dismal human rights situation. 
The Organization of American States has adopted a stance on Cuban issues that is 
very similar to that of the United Nations.  In 1996, the organization approved a 
resolution condemning the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.  The 
resolution, approved by all member states with the exception of the United States, decried 
the legislation as a threat to international law and commerce.  (Richardson and Weiss, 
1997, p. 2)  In late 1997, the group reaffirmed its commitment to the Santiago 
Declaration by amending its charter to allow the institution to isolate any government 
whose leader comes to power by a coup (“International…,” 1999, p. 2).  Thus, although 
the Organization of American States criticizes the current United States policy, it also 
refuses to accept Cuba as a participating member of its institution because of the island’s 
lack of democracy and poor human rights record. 
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As a third major inter-governmental organization with an interest in Cuba, the 
European Union has maintained a slightly more liberal position towards the island.  Like 
the United Nations and the Organization of American States, the European Union does 
not support the United States’ embargo of Cuba.  Instead, it seeks to promote change in 
Cuba through economic and political ties.  Since 1996, the European Union has affirmed 
a common position that links full economic cooperation to the communist regime’s 
improvement of human rights and basic freedoms on the island.  However, Cuba has 
rejected European efforts to cajole it into making political changes.  Nevertheless, the 
European Union invited Cuba to be an observer to the Lomé Treaty, which established 
favorable trade agreements with less developed countries.  (“Summary…,” 1999, p. 9)  
Moreover, the European Union has provided humanitarian aid to Cuba in the form of 
shipments of food, medicines, and medical supplies (Cuba, 2000, p. 8).  Despite the 
European Union’s attempts to link economic engagement with political opening, Cuba 
has refused to agree to political change. 
Ultimately, these inter-governmental organizations share a similar position.  Each 
criticizes both the United States’ embargo and Cuba’s political and human rights 
situation.  However, none of these institutions has shown significant progress in changing 
the political environment in Cuba. 
D. COMPARISON OF CUBA’S INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT TO THE 
CASE STUDIES 
Building on the analysis of the political institutions in Cuba, this section compares 
the institutional environment on the island with the institutional environments of each of 
the Soviet bloc case studies.  This comparison provides the foundation for Chapter V, 
which draws out the implications of the similarities and differences found in the 
comparisons.  This section divides the comparisons in three initial parts.  Each section 
focuses on one of the following types of political institutions: elite, mass-based, and 
external.  The fourth part of this chapter looks at the institutions collectively, and shows 
how Cuba’s institutional environment is most similar to the institutional environments in 
pre-transition Romania and Bulgaria. 
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1. Comparison of Elite Institutions 
An effective comparison of elite institutions recognizes that during a transition 
some elite institutions prefer a continuation of the non-democratic system while others 
desire to replace that system with a multi-party democracy.  Thus, this comparison of 
Cuba’s elite institutions to those in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria looks at 
both pro-communist and anti-communist institutions.  Overall, this comparison 
demonstrates that Cuba’s pro-communist elite institutions most resemble those in 
Romania while its anti-communist elite institutions appear similar to those in Poland, 
Romania, and Bulgaria. 
Table 1 compares Cuba’s elite institutions to those found in the case study Soviet 
bloc countries prior to their transitions towards democracy.  Each of eleven elite  
Elite Institutions Hungary Poland Romania Bulgaria Cuba 
Communist Party H H M H M 
Nuclear Communist 
Elite L L H L H 
Communist Hardliners M M M M M 
Communist Reformers H H L H L 
Government 
Bureaucracies L L L L L 
Military L L M L H 
Internal Security Forces L L M L M 
Opposition Parties H L L L L 
Opposition Moderates H L L L L 
Opposition Radicals M L L L L 
Dissident Intellectuals L L L L L 
Assessments of Institutional Strengths: H = High; M = Moderate; L = Low 
Table 1. Comparison of Elite Institutions 
institutions receives a ranking of high (H), moderate (M), or low (L) depending on the 
relative strength of the given institution.  The ranking of the strengths takes into account 
both interstate and intrastate comparisons.  The first seven institutions represent pro-
communist institutions.   Even though some of these institutions, such as the communist 
reformers, promoted political opening, each of these institutions preferred the 
continuation of their own power in a socialist or semi-socialist system.   The communist 
party category represents the cumulative strength of the communist hardliners and 
reformers.  The nuclear communist elite represents a small group of communist leaders, 
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such as coalesced around Ceauşescu in Romania, that effectively operates independently 
and above the communist party hierarchy.  The government bureaucracies category 
represents all government bureaucracies with the exception of the military and the 
internal security forces, which are listed separately.  The final four elite institutions in 
Table 1 represent the anti-communist institutions.  These institutions do not need much 
explanation, but one should note that the elite opposition parties category reflects the 
combined strength of moderate and radical elite opposition institutions and factions. 
 In each of the five countries, the pro-communist elite institutions hold a 
significant amount of power.  Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria display similar elite 
institutional environments.  Each country lacked a nuclear communist elite; thus, the pro-
communist strength dwelt in the communist party and its hard-line and reform groups.  
By the time key transitional events began occurring in these countries, the communist 
reformers enjoyed high institutional strength while the communist hardliners’ power had 
waned to moderate levels.  Still, the communist party maintained a position of strength 
and represented an important actor in the transition.  In Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria 
the government bureaucracies, the military, and the security forces did not play an 
important role in the transition process, and Table 1 reflects this by noting these 
institutions’ low strengths.    
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 Pro-communist elite institutional strength also characterizes Romania and Cuba, 
but the distribution of power among their pro-communist actors varies from that of 
Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria.  Nuclear communist elites dominated the pro-communist 
elite institutions in Romania, and Cuba displays a similar pattern today as noted by the 
small group of hard-line communist insiders that surrounds Castro.  In both countries, the 
communist party has only moderate strength due to its subordination to the nuclear 
communist elites.  Within the communist parties, hardliners retain the majority of the 
influence.  Communist reformers in Romania and Cuba have demonstrated a low level of 
institutional strength, as have government bureaucracies.  However, just as the military 
played an increasingly prominent role in Romania in the late 1980s, the Cuban military 
expanded its role and institutional strength in the 1990s.  In fact, the Cuban military’s 
institutional strength today is higher than was that of the Romanian military prior to the 
collapse of the Ceauşescu regime.  In both Cuba and Romania, the internal security forces 
display moderate institutional strength.  Ultimately, the pro-communist elite institutions 
in Cuba most closely resemble those of Romania prior to its transition to democracy. 
 In terms of the anti-communist elite institutions, a different pattern arises.  In the 
exceptional case of Hungary, the anti-communist elite institutions demonstrated strengths 
comparable to those of the pro-communist elite institutions.  Although dissident 
intellectuals had low institutional strength, the elite opposition parties enjoyed high 
institutional strength.  Among these groups, the moderates held more strength than the 
radicals.  This relative balance of institutional strength between pro- and anti-communist 
elite institutions explains why the transition in Hungary was the only Soviet bloc case 
study to experience a transition involving an important pact.   
In contrast, the anti-communist elite institutions in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, 
and Cuba lack significant institutional strength.  Anti-communist elite institutions in these 
Soviet bloc countries engaged in minor roles in their respective political environments.  
Like Cuba today, each country had dissident intellectuals and some elite opposition, but 
these institutions did not obtain more than a low level of institutional strength.  In short, 
the anti-communist elite institutions in Cuba are essentially the same as those in Poland, 
Romania, and Bulgaria. 
2. Comparison of Mass-Based Institutions 
Like the comparison of the elite institutions, an effective comparison of the mass-
based institutions recognizes that some institutions support the communist system while 
others oppose it.  Therefore, this section compares Cuba’s mass-based institutions to 
those in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, focusing on both pro-communist 
organizations and anti-communist organizations.   Overall, this comparison demonstrates 
that Cuba’s mass-based institutions do not mirror exactly the mass-based institutional 
environment of any of the case studies.  However, its pro-communist mass-based 
institutions emulate those of all of the case study countries, and its anti-communist ones 
are most similar to those in Hungary and Bulgaria. 
Table 2 compares Cuba’s mass-based institutions with those of the case study 
countries.  This table lists only one pro-communist mass-based institution, the communist 
auxiliary organizations.  This category covers a wide range of institutions; any mass-
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based organization co-opted by or affiliated with the communist regime falls under this 
heading.  The following five mass-based institutions are anti-communist organizations.  
These include mass-based opposition parties, demonstrations, civil society, religious 
organizations, and secular non-governmental organizations.  The categories are 
straightforward with the possible of exception of the civil society category.  The civil 
society category reflects the vibrancy of independent mass-based organizations. 
Mass-Based Institutions Hungary Poland Romania Bulgaria Cuba 
Communist Auxiliaries L L L L L 
Opposition Parties L H L M L 
Demonstrations M M H M L 
Civil Society M L L L L 




L L M L L 
Assessments of Institutional Strengths: H = High; M = Moderate; L = Low 
Table 2. Comparison of Mass-Based Institutions 
Focusing first on the pro-communist mass-based institutions, one can see that all 
five countries share similarly-weak communist auxiliary organizations.  In the case study 
countries, these auxiliary organizations experienced a loss of popular support as the 
transition approached.  Membership in organizations such as youth leagues declined 
throughout the 1980s, leaving the organizational structures intact but lacking in popular 
support and participation.  The same has been seen in Cuba in the last decade.  Although 
the number of communist auxiliary organizations on the island remains high, the 
membership in and popular fervor for these institutions has dropped throughout the 
1990s.  Thus, Cuba’s pro-communist mass-based institutions, like those of the case study 
countries, retain only low levels of institutional strength today. 
Patterns among the anti-communist mass-based institutions are more difficult to 
discern.  Hungary and Bulgaria share a similar overall weakness in mass-based 
institutions although the distribution of strength among the institutions varies.  
Considering that Hungary and Bulgaria’s transitions occurred in modes of transitions 
characterized by elite action, it should not be surprising that their mass-based institutional 
environments show generally low levels of institutional strength.  All of Hungary’s anti-
communist mass-based institutions held only low levels of institutional strength with the 
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exception of demonstrations and civil society, which both had moderate institutional 
strength.  The demonstrations and the growth of social groups and quasi-political 
organizations in civil society may not have directly influenced the transition in Hungary, 
but they did indirectly provide bargaining power to the elites. 
Similarly, the only Bulgarian anti-communist mass-based institutions to enjoy 
more than a low level of institutional strength were the opposition parties and 
demonstrations, which held moderate levels of institutional strength.  The growth of 
opposition political groups and the eventual emergence of demonstrations in Bulgaria did 
not force a transition, but they certainly provided more reasons for the communist 
reformers to pursue an imposition.  Thus, in Hungary and Bulgaria the anti-communist 
mass-based institutions were not very strong, yet they still affected the transition process 
indirectly. 
In contrast, the case study countries that experienced a transition as a result of 
mass action displayed greater levels of institutional strength among their anti-communist 
mass-based organizations.  In Poland, the opposition party, Solidarity, had a high level of 
institutional strength, which gave it a strong position in negotiations with the 
communists.  Although the Roman Catholic Church’s institutional strength was waning 
by the time of the transition, it did enjoy a moderate level of institutional strength as did 
the popular demonstrations, which served as visible reminders of the extent of 
Solidarity’s societal support.  Civil society and secular non-governmental organizations 
in Poland were the only organizations with low levels of institutional strength. 
In Romania, high levels of mass-based anti-communist institutional strength dwelt 
in the violent popular demonstrations.  Prior to these expressions of popular dissent, anti-
communist mass-based institutional strength resided solely in the religious organizations 
and secular non-governmental organizations.  These, however, only had moderate levels 
of institutional strength.  The demonstrations produced the turning point in the 
transitional process in Romania and forced the Ceauşescu regime to capitulate.  
Opposition parties and civil society remained weak throughout the crucial stages of the 
transition process in Romania.  Overall, Poland and Romania shared the similarity of 
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fairly strong anti-communist mass-based institutions that directly affected the course of 
their transitions. 
Unfortunately, Cuba does not clearly fit either of the institutional patterns.  
Generally, Cuba’s anti-communist mass-based institutions remain weak and fragmented; 
thus, they have only low levels of institutional strength.  The only exceptions are the 
religious organizations, represented primarily by the Roman Catholic Church, which 
enjoy a moderate level of institutional strength.  Initially, the strength of religious 
organizations might suggest that Cuba’s mass-based institutions appear most like those 
Poland or Romania, countries where the church remained a constant source of opposition 
for the communists and supported dissidents and political opening in at least some 
degree.  Despite this similarity, Cuba lacks the strong political opposition that gave 
Poland’s Solidarity its power.  Furthermore, while Cuba appears even more similar 
institutionally to pre-demonstration mass-based environment in Romania, it currently 
lacks the crucial protests and high levels of mass unrest that defined the latter’s transition. 
In a broader perspective, Cuba currently resembles Hungary or Bulgaria more 
closely in terms of its anti-communist mass-based institutions.  Hungary and Bulgaria 
both had low levels of institutional strength in this category.  Cuba’s anti-communist 
mass-based institutional strength is even lower.  Therefore, despite the strength of the 
Church in Cuba, one must recognize that even though Cuba’s anti-communist mass-based 
institutional environment does not duplicate that of any of the case studies, it appears 
more like that of Hungary or Bulgaria than that of Poland or Romania. 
3. Comparison of External Institutions 
External institutions form the final group of institutions to compare between Cuba 
and the Soviet bloc countries.  Similar to the comparison of the mass-based institutions, 
this comparison demonstrates that Cuba’s external institutional environment does not fit 
the exact profile of any of the case studies.  It does, however, most closely resemble the 
external institutional environment of Romania. 
Table 3 compares the external institutions in Cuba with those in Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, and Bulgaria.  In contrast to the previous institutions, the external institutions 
cannot be as definitively divided between pro- and anti-communist institutions.  In the 
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case studies, the communist bloc states, especially the Soviet Union, may have favored 
the continuation of a socialist system, but through action or, more commonly, inaction 
they generally favored reforms or political self-determination.  In the case of Cuba, the 
remaining communist bloc states today do favor the continuation of the socialist system.  
The final three institutions, the non-communist bloc states, the non-governmental 
organizations, and the inter-governmental organizations largely seek major political 
changes in Cuba. 
External Institutions Hungary Poland Romania Bulgaria Cuba 
Communist Bloc States M M L H L 
Non-Communist Bloc 
States M M L L L 
Non-Governmental 
Organizations L L M L L 
Inter-Governmental 
Organizations L L L L L 
Assessments of Institutional Strengths: H = High; M = Moderate; L = Low 
Table 3. Comparison of External Institutions 
Looking for interstate similarities, one notices that Hungary and Poland’s external 
institutional environments appear similar.  In both of these countries, action by the Soviet 
Union represented the majority of the influence of the communist bloc countries.  The 
Soviet Union’s moderate institutional strength reflects its decision to allow the individual 
countries of Central Europe to self-determine their political future.  The repudiation of 
the Brezhnev Doctrine solidified the Soviet decision to release its satellite states to their 
own destinies.  In this way, the Soviet commitment to inaction created the political space 
necessary for the Soviet bloc transitions.  The non-communist bloc states, represented 
primarily by the United States and Western Europe, filled the political space left by the 
Soviet Union.  This allowed them to have a moderate level of institutional strength 
through promotion of respect for human rights and encouragement of democratic 
reforms.  Due to the domination of the external political environment by the major Cold 
War actors, non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations played minor roles 
in the transitions in Hungary and Poland and, therefore, can be characterized as having 
low institutional strength. 
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Although this same type of pressure targeted Romania and Bulgaria, these 
countries responded differently.  Romania’s communists ignored the pressure for reform 
from both the East and the West.  Thus, the institutional strength of the communist and 
non-communist bloc states remained low throughout the transition.  However, Romania 
appears as a unique case in that non-governmental organizations achieved a moderate 
level of strength during the most critical days of the transition.  Foreign media outlets 
with penetration in Romania aided the revolution by using information about protests in 
various parts of Romania to encourage and embolden other Romanians to join the 
revolutionary process.  Still, inter-governmental organizations did not play a noteworthy 
role in Romania’s transition. 
In Bulgaria, the communist bloc states, specifically the Soviet Union, 
demonstrated a high level of institutional strength.  Meanwhile, the other three external 
institutions showed only low levels of institutional strength.  Bulgaria effectively ignored 
the small amount of pressure it received from the non-communist bloc states, and, like 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania, it remained untargeted by inter-governmental 
organizations.  In contrast, the Soviet Union’s high level of institutional strength reflected 
the special attention that Bulgaria gave to its traditional hegemon.  The communist 
reformers’ acquisition of specific permission from Moscow to impose a transition served 
as a concrete example of the Soviet Union’s influence over the Bulgarian transitional 
process. 
Today, Cuba’s external institutional environment does not exactly match that of 
any of the case studies.  Despite the continued pressure for reform from non-communist 
bloc states and despite the greatly increased post-Cold War role of non- and inter-
governmental organizations in pressuring the island for change, Cuba has effectively 
ignored the political pressure from all sides.  As the sole survivor of the dissolution of 
Soviet-style communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Cuba’s internal political 
environment also operates independently from the few remaining members of the global 
communist bloc.  In this way, Cuba most resembles Romania prior to the crucial events 
in its transition.  After the revocation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and before external non-
governmental organizations affected the course of events in Romania, low levels of 
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institutional strength characterized all the organizations in Romania’s external 
institutional environment. 
Ultimately, Cuba’s external institutional environment does not mirror that of any 
of the case studies.  Nevertheless, it appears most similar to that of Romania with the 
following important exception: external non-governmental organizations have not 
succeeded in helping to instigate a revolution on the island. 
4. Overall Comparison of Institutional Environments 
An integration of the results of the previous sections into a single comparison 
with the institutional environment in Cuba aids in understanding the island’s overall 
institutional situation.  This process demonstrates that although Cuba’s institutional 
environment does perfectly match any of those of the case study countries, on balance it 
most resembles that of Romania. 
Table 4 summarizes the analysis of the previous three tables.  In every category 
except for one, Cuba’s institutional environment most closely matches that of Romania.  
The deviant category is that of the anti-communist mass-based institutions, in which 
Cuba’s institutions appear more like those in Hungary and Bulgaria.  Nevertheless, these 
similarities and that between the external institutional environments in Cuba and 
Romania are not exact but rather are the closest matches.  Bulgaria follows Romania as 
the case study country with the next highest level of institutional similarity with Cuba.  
Bulgaria’s institutional environment is similar to that of Cuba in three of the five 
categories.  With only two matching categories, Hungary and Poland’s institutional 
environments show the lowest similarities with the institutional environment in Cuba.   
Overall, although Cuba’s institutional environment is not a perfect match with 
that of Romania during the crucial stages of its transition, it does resemble that of 
Romania more than that of any of the other Soviet bloc case study countries. 
Political Institutions Case Study Country Most Like Cuba 
Pro-Communist Elite Institutions Romania 
Anti-Communist Elite Institutions Poland, Romania, Bulgaria 
Pro-Communist Mass-Based Institutions Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria 
Anti-Communist Based Institutions Hungary, Bulgaria 
External Institutions Romania 
Table 4. Comparison of Overall Institutional Environment 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CUBA’S NEXT TRANSITION   
 
 
Having analyzed the importance of political institutions in the transitions in 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria and having compared the institutional 
environments of those countries to that of Cuba, this study now draws out the 
implications that this comparison creates for the next transition in Cuba.  First, this 
section seeks to determine the relative influence that internal and external institutions will 
have on Cuba’s transition to democracy.  Next, this section looks at whether or not 
Cuba’s next transition will be towards democracy or towards another form of 
government.  Finally, this section looks beyond the next transition to explore the possible 
routes towards consolidated democracy in Cuba.  In assessing each of these areas, this 
section draws from the institutional analyses and comparisons carried out in Chapters III 
and IV.   
In looking at these three areas, this section is divided into three major subsections.  
Focusing on the relative importance of internal and external institutions in transitions 
towards democracy, the first part proposes that internal institutions will play a more 
crucial role than will external ones in Cuba’s next transition.  The second part suggests 
that Cuba’s next transition will not be a democratic one because Cuba is not ready 
institutionally for such a transition.  Specifically, Cuba lacks oppositional institutions 
with sufficient strength to challenge the dominant communist institutions.  The final part 
of this section looks beyond Cuba’s next transition and suggests that when Cuba makes a 
transition to democracy it is likely to be by imposition given the current institutional 
environment affecting the island. 
 A. IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEXT 
TRANSITION IN CUBA  
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Based on the experiences of both the case studies and Cuba to date, this work 
argues that internal institutions will matter the most in Cuba’s next transition.  Internal 
institutions are crucial for two reasons.  First, the necessary changes in the external 
institutional environment for a transition to democracy have already occurred.  Second, 
even such external changes are not sufficient to ensure a transition towards democracy.  
This section elaborates on these arguments.   
The case studies suggest that changes in the external institutional environment are 
necessary but not sufficient to promote transitions to democracy in Soviet-style 
communist states.  Certainly, the Soviet decision to forego intervention in the internal 
political environments of its Central European satellite states both reduced the effective 
power of the communists and emboldened the opposition groups in these countries.  
Significantly, each of the transitions in the Warsaw Pact countries occurred after the 
Gorbachev regime began to allow and promote political reform of the socialist system.   
Furthermore, once the first Central European transition began, the demonstration 
effect helped to speed the remaining political transformations throughout the region as 
the communist holdouts became more and more isolated from their traditional 
institutional sources of external support.  Moreover, Western appeals for democratic 
opening in the Soviet bloc states quickly followed the relinquishment of Soviet 
hegemony in the region.  However, if the Soviet Union had continued to protect 
communism through military action and if the West had not encouraged democratization 
in the area, the transitions in the case study countries likely would not have been possible.   
Despite the necessary condition provided by changes in the external institutional 
environment, these adjustments were not sufficient to produce transitions to democracy.  
Without changes in the internal institutional environment, no transitions would have 
occurred.  From the case studies, Romania provides a good example of this interaction of 
external and internal institutions.  If Romania could have called upon the Soviet Union to 
restore order and support the communists in the early stages of unrest, the crucial 
demonstrations on 21 December probably would not have materialized and, if they had, 
Ceauşescu probably would have been unwilling to abandon power.  Thus, the changes in 
the external institutional environment negated Romania’s previous ability to call upon the 
Soviet Union for support and helped to create the necessary political space for the 
country’s transition. 
However, once Romania was free to determine its own political future, the 
internal institutional environment became the most crucial in affecting a transition 
towards democracy.  Without the development of popular unrest, Romania would have 
continued to embrace a socialist system.  The communists, including both the Ceauşescu 
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elite and the party members, were content with their positions and had no intentions to 
begin a reform through imposition.  The important factor that changed this situation was 
the occurrence of the demonstrations.  Without the development of a strong internal 
opposition, Romania could not have made the transition to democracy even though the 
necessary changes in the external institutional environment had already taken place. 
In terms of Cuba, the island’s external institutional environment has already made 
the necessary changes to support a transition to democracy.  The end of the Cold War 
assured that Cuba’s already fairly isolated position was made even more so.  More than a 
decade after the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, there clearly is no external institution 
willing to intervene in Cuba to ensure the survival of its communist system.  On the 
contrary, the majority of the most powerful members of the international community, 
including other states and non- and inter-governmental organizations, support the 
democratization of Cuba.  Therefore, the remaining necessary condition to be fulfilled for 
a transition to democracy in Cuba is the emergence of a strong internal opposition.  For 
this reason, the internal institutional environment will play the most crucial role in 
preparing Cuba for a transition to democracy. 
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Several authors support this position.  For example, Guillermo O’Donnell and 
Schmitter argue, “[D]omestic factors play a predominant role in the transition [towards 
democracy].”  Similarly, Laurence Whitehead purposes, “[I]nternal forces were of 
primary importance in determining the course and outcome of the transition attempt, and 
international factors played only a secondary role.”  (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 72-3)  
Some authors make even more specific statements on the importance of individual 
internal political institutions.  For example, Linz and Stepan assert “that there is no 
transition whose beginning is not the consequence -- direct or indirect -- of important 
divisions within the authoritarian regime itself” (1996, p. 72).  In specific reference to 
Cuba, Javier Corrales contests, “Cuba has been exposed to the same changes that have 
triggered regime transitions elsewhere in Latin America.  The missing ingredient is 
political parties.”  Corrales argues that the current levels of protest and resistance in Cuba 
are not sufficient societal pressures for change.  He adds, “[O]nly parties could provide 
effective sanctions against incumbents who refuse to liberalize.”  (2001, pp. 101-2)  
Although this sampling of opinions on transitions towards democracy implicitly supports 
the necessary contribution of external institutions and demonstrates a lack of consensus 
on the specific internal institutional changes that will produce such a transition, it does 
show that scholars agree that internal institutional changes are necessary for a transition 
away from authoritarianism. 
Ultimately, internal institutional changes will play the most important role in 
creating the remaining necessary condition, domestic opposition, for a transition to 
democracy in Cuba.  The institutional similarities between Romania and Cuba support 
this position.  With the necessary external institutional changes already accomplished, 
internal institutions will matter most in determining the nature of Cuba’s next transition. 
B. THE NEXT TRANSITION IN CUBA: AUTHORITARIAN SUCCESSION 
Focusing on the internal political environment in Cuba, this section argues that 
Cuba is not ready institutionally for a transition to democracy.  As alluded to in the 
previous section, Cuba lacks the internal opposition necessary for a transition to 
democracy.  Therefore, Cuba’s next transition will most likely be one of authoritarian 
succession through imposition.  The experiences of the case study countries provide 
support for this argument. 
Chapter IV demonstrated that Cuba’s institutional environment appears most 
similar to that of Romania.  Without a consideration of the important institutional 
differences between these two countries, one could incorrectly assume that Cuba’s next 
transition will be a revolution.  In order for a revolution to occur, however, massive 
unrest must prompt widespread anti-communist demonstrations on the island.  As of the 
present, neither demonstrations nor extreme mass-based political dissatisfaction with the 
Castro elite has materialized.  Certainly, most Cubans do not enjoy economic prosperity, 
but the country’s economic troubles have not produced massive political frustration, even 
during the worst period of the economic crisis in the mid-1990s.  On the contrary, most 
Cubans remain ardent fidelistas and continue to support their homegrown hero.  
Immigration has provided and continues to provide an important escape valve for Cuba in 
allowing those Cubans opposed to Castro to seek refuge elsewhere within the 
international community.  Thus, until significant signs show that such unrest is building 
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among the populace, one cannot assume that Cuba’s next transition will be revolutionary 
in its mode of transition. 
Since a Cuban transition by revolution is not currently a possibility, one must 
consider the other options.  As seen in Chapter IV, Cuba does not have an elite 
opposition.  This eliminates the prospect of a pacted transition.  Also, Cuba’s anti-
communist mass-based institutions remain weak overall.  Only the religious 
organizations have achieved a higher-than-low institutional strength, and their moderate 
strength is not sufficient to challenge the very strong elite communist institutions.  Due to 
the lack of a strong mass-based opposition able to force negotiations with the 
government, transition through reform must also be eliminated as an option for Cuba’s 
next transition.   
Having thus eliminated three of the modes of transition, the final option for 
Cuba’s next transition is through imposition.  Interestingly, the case study example of 
Bulgaria, which experienced a transition through imposition, is as similar institutionally 
to Cuba in as many categories as is Romania when the external institutions are ignored 
(See Table 4).  Arguing that Cuba’s internal institutions will matter most in its next 
transition, focusing on the internal institutional categories is logical.  Again, however, 
one should not assume that Cuba’s transition will be the same as Bulgaria’s without 
considering the institutional differences between the countries.   
To begin, Cuba’s communist elites differ from those found in the Bulgarian case 
study.  The nuclear communist elite in Cuba controls the party and the other important 
elite institutions, the military and the internal security forces.  Bulgaria, on the other 
hand, had no nuclear communist elite.  Rather, Bulgaria’s communist party was the 
dominant elite institution, and its reform faction was strong enough to begin the 
imposition process.  In Cuba, the nuclear communist elite has purged the party apparatus 
of reformers who would like to change the island’s type of government.  Therefore, a 
communist imposition of a transition towards democracy remains unfeasible given 
Cuba’s current institutional environment.  Moreover, Cuba’s anti-communist mass-based 
institutions are not as strong as were Bulgaria’s prior to its transition.  Bulgarian 
reformers recognized the growing, potential strength of these mass-based institutions and 
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hoped to preempt radical change by imposing a controlled transition away from 
authoritarianism.  Cuba’s relatively stable and weak anti-communist mass-based 
institutions do not pose a sufficient threat to its communist elites to force the latter to 
pursue preemptive reforms. 
These differences between Cuba and Bulgaria suggest that Cuba’s elites will not 
impose a transition away from authoritarianism.  However, since they are the only strong 
political institution in Cuba, they can still impose a transition.  For these institutional 
reasons, Cuba’s next transition will most likely be characterized by the imposition of an 
authoritarian successor regime.  This certainly is the current intent of Cuba’s communists 
and has been presaged by the designation of Raúl Castro as Fidel’s successor.  Figure 7 
reflects this argument and places Cuba’s next transition in the most elite-driven and 
forceful corner of the imposition mode.  Moreover, Figure 7 places Cuba’s next mode of 
transition on the extreme internal end of the z-axis to reflect the prominence of internal 
institutions in determining the outcome of Cuba’s next transition. 
 
Figure 7. Cuba’s Next Mode of Transition 
Overall, the institutional analysis suggests that although Cuba most resembles the 
case studies of Romania and Bulgaria, its next transition will be unlike any of the case 
studies in that it will not be towards democracy.  Cuba’s next transition is most likely to 
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be the imposition of a successor authoritarian regime by the island’s communists because 
the country lacks a sufficiently strong opposition to challenge its communist elites. 
C. CUBA’S EVENTUAL TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
Even though Cuba’s next transition most likely will not be towards democracy, it 
still is beneficial to consider what may characterize Cuba’s eventual transition to 
democracy.  This section looks at how Cuba’s institutional environment may progress 
after the next authoritarian succession based on the current strength of Cuba’s 
institutions.  It argues that Cuba’s eventual transition to democracy is likely to be by 
imposition although this scenario becomes less likely over time. 
Significant changes in Cuba’s institutional environment are unlikely until after 
power passes from Fidel Castro to his successor.  Castro has demonstrated a firm 
commitment to socialism and to ensuring a smooth transition to Cuba’s next communist 
leadership.  If events progress as the communists have planned, Raúl Castro will be the 
successor.  Because the younger Castro does not enjoy the same amount of personal 
following among Cubans, a weakening of Cuba’s nuclear communist elite likely will 
accompany his assumption of control.  As Cuba’s nuclear communist elite loses 
institutional power, its strength likely will pass to the communist party.  In this scenario, 
the division between Cuba’s communist hardliners and reformers will become more 
apparent. 
As the institutional strength moves from the nuclear communist elite and becomes 
contested by the hardliner and reformer sections, Cuba’s elite communist institutions are 
more likely to resemble those in Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria.  Lacking a nuclear 
communist elite, these Soviet bloc countries entered the most crucial periods of their 
transitions with a strong communist party whose strength favored the reformers.  Cuba’s 
institutional development also is likely to follow this path.  As the distance in time from 
Fidel’s departure of power increases, the strength of the communist reformers likely will 
grow more rapidly. 
Importantly, changes in the communist party in the last decade seem to 
foreshadow this shift.  Cuba’s nuclear communist elite has taken more aggressive action 
in controlling the influence of more reform-minded party members since the late 1980s.  
95 
This was demonstrated by purges within the politburo and the shrinking of its size.  This 
signals a growth, albeit repressed, in reform-mindedness among Cuba’s party members.  
Moreover, communists in Cuba, including the nuclear communist elite, responded 
pragmatically to the economic crisis that began in the mid-1980s and peaked a decade 
later.  Growing integration into the world market and domestic economic liberalization 
show that the communists can flex their policies when necessary.  Similar political 
changes largely have been absent because political pressure, unlike the aforementioned 
economic pressure, has not threatened to destroy completely Cuban socialism. 
Of course, for a transition towards democracy to occur, changes in the anti-
communist institutions must also take place.  Peaceful changes are unlikely as long as the 
nuclear communist elites or hardliners remain in control.  As communist reformers gain 
greater institutional strength relative to the hardliners, more political space will be created 
for the growth of anti-communist institutions.  Since the majority of Cuba’s fledgling 
anti-communist institutions today are mass-based, these types of institutions, as opposed 
to elite ones, most likely will dominate the anti-communist opposition.   
Reflecting the probable shifts in power among Cuba’s institutions, Figure 8 
proposes the likely movement of Cuba’s mode of transition over time.  As changes in the 
pro- and anti-communist institutions occur, Cuba’s mode of transition is likely to move  
 
Figure 8. Cuba’s Eventual Democratic Mode of Transition 
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further away from its current position in the extreme corner of the imposition mode.  As 
pressure from mass-based institutions increases, the likelihood of imposition decreases.  
This pressure is likely to build slowly initially.  However, as time progresses, this 
pressure likely will increase more rapidly.  Certainly, this was the case in the Soviet bloc 
transitions. 
Generally, three options exist.  The most probable remains a transition by 
imposition towards democracy.  Due to the demonstrated pragmatism of Cuba’s 
communists and to their likely desire to stay involved in Cuban politics in the post-
authoritarian system, they are likely to institute changes from above in response to 
growing anti-communist pressure from below.  Assuming that the strength of such anti-
communist institutions continues to increase over time, the longer the communists wait to 
begin an imposition, the more likely that Cuba’s mode of transition will move away from 
the imposition mode. 
If Cuba’s transition moves away from the imposition mode, two results remain 
the most plausible.  If the communists continue to repress mass-based institutions while 
pressure for change grows among the population, a revolution could result.  Unable to 
channel their dissatisfaction through political institutions, Cubans might support violent 
protests.  These demonstrations then could create a situation similar to that in Romania, 
where communist commitment to the socialist system evaporated once the party and its 
members were threatened by violent mass protests.   
The final option is that of a transition by reform.  If communists allow the 
creation of oppositional mass-based institutions and fail to preemptively impose a 
transition, these anti-communist organizations likely will develop enough strength over 
time to force changes in Cuba’s political system in a transition similar to that in the 
Polish case study.  In addition, a transition towards democracy by reform is more likely 
to involve a greater amount of participation by external institutions than one by 
imposition or revolution.  A government open and vulnerable to a transition by reform is 
likely to be more responsive to pressure for change from external institutions also. 
Overall, Cuba’s eventual transition to democracy most likely will occur in the 
imposition mode of transition.  However, as the distance in time from Fidel Castro’s 
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departure increases, a transition by imposition becomes less probable.  Depending on the 
manner in which the relative strengths of Cuba’s institutions change over time, a 
transition towards democracy through reform or, less likely, revolution cannot be 
eliminated as implausible. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Having given considerable space herein to each of the previous chapters, this 
study now broadens its observations to review its most significant findings and 
arguments.  Moreover, it considers how policy makers in the international community 
can most effectively apply the implications of this work to their decision-making 
processes.  Finally, it highlights the imperative of continued research on Cuba’s 
institutional environment. 
This study set out to examine what can be learned about Cuba’s next transition 
from a comparison of political institutions in Cuba with those in Soviet bloc countries 
that made their transitions towards democracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The 
primary argument of this work has been that political institutions matter in shaping the 
nature of regime transitions.  As Chapter II explored Karl and Schmitter’s framework for 
describing different modes of transitions, it found that a general consensus among 
scholars supports this assumption even though many of these authors dispute the specifics 
of political transitions.  While this work does not proclaim Karl and Schmitter’s 
framework to be the only applicable guide to analysis, it used the framework throughout 
the study because it provided a straightforward method for choosing and analyzing the 
case studies and because it allowed a simple, visual portrayal of the interaction of 
political institutions during different modes of transition. 
Having thus described its methodology, this work then continued by analyzing 
four case studies of Soviet bloc transitions towards democracy in Chapter III.  Chapter III 
looked specifically at four countries that represented four different modes of transitions.  
Hungary provided the closest example of a pacted transition while Poland, Romania, and 
Bulgaria conformed respectively to the reform, revolution, and imposition modes of 
transition.  In reassessing Karl and Schmitter’s analysis of these countries’ modes of 
transition, this work generally affirmed the authors’ location of the Soviet bloc transitions 
in terms of both the elite and mass-based institutions and the strategies of force and 
compromise.  However, this study added a third axis to Karl and Schmitter’s diagram.  
This z-axis expanded the ability of the framework to portray the complete spectrum of 
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political institutions involved in transitions by showing the relative importance of internal 
and external institutions in the case study transitions.  In this manner, Chapter III 
provided the case studies against which to compare the Cuban case. 
In a pattern similar to that used in Chapter III, Chapter IV explored the current 
state of Cuba’s elite, mass-based, and external institutions.  Clearly, Cuba’s communist 
elite institutions hold the greatest institutional strength among its internal institutions.  A 
nuclear communist elite centered on Castro and an increasingly politically-involved 
military form the cornerstones of the communist regime.  Elite and mass-based 
opposition remains weak and fragmented in Cuba.  The most powerful of such 
institutions are the religious ones, and they serve more as an inconvenience to the 
communists than as a source of strong opposition to them.  Chapter IV also compared 
Cuba’s current institutional environment to the institutional environments in the Soviet 
bloc case studies during the most crucial phases of their transitions.  Even though Cuba’s 
institutional environment does not exactly mirror any of those found in the case studies, it 
most strongly resembles those in Romania and Bulgaria. 
Building on this institutional comparison, Chapter V drew out the implications for 
Cuba’s next transition.  It looked not only at the similarities between Cuba and the case 
studies but also at the differences among them.  In this way, it sought to determine the 
mode of Cuba’s next transition.  Chapter V proposed three fundamental assertions about 
Cuba’s political future.  First, it argued that internal institutions will matter most in 
Cuba’s next transition because the necessary external conditions for a transition toward 
democracy in Cuba already exist.  Second, it placed Cuba’s next mode of transition 
firmly in the imposition mode and contended that an installation of a communist 
successor, not a move towards democracy, will characterize this imposition.  Finally, it 
argued that Cuba’s eventual transition to democracy most likely will occur in the 
imposition mode of transition but that as the distance in time from Castro’s departure 
increases, so does the likelihood that its transitional mode will move towards the reform 
or, less likely, the revolution categories.  Ultimately, Chapter V proposed that Cuba is not 
yet institutionally ready for a transition to democracy because it lacks oppositional 
institutions strong enough to challenge the communist regime. 
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A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although this work is useful as an exercise in understanding the interaction 
among political institutions during regime transitions, its application should be more than 
academic.  The implications for Cuba’s next transition derived from the institutional 
analysis can aid decision makers in the international community, including the United 
States, in determining how to formulate policy on Cuba that effectively promotes a stable 
transition towards consolidated democracy on the island.  This work proposes the 
following three general tenets to guide the international community in supporting such a 
transition: avoid a violent revolution, promote an independent Cuban civil society, and 
seek an international consensus on Cuba’s future.  The following sections explain how 
these recommendations can guide decision makers in creating progressive policy on 
Cuba. 
1. Avoid a Violent Revolution 
First, policy makers must consider what type of transition to democracy is most 
desirable in Cuba.  In answering this question, one must acknowledge that in some cases 
there may be a trade-off between an early transition and a successful transition.  
Regardless of the time frame, Cuba must be prepared institutionally for democracy before 
it can become democratic.  Therefore, to promote a successful transition to democracy in 
Cuba, decision makers in the international community should promote a stable, peaceful 
transition to democracy and make every effort to avoid a violent revolution on the island. 
A revolution is not the most desirable mode of transition for Cuba’s move 
towards democracy for several reasons.  As Karl and Schmitter suggest, a revolution 
appears to be the mode of transition that least is likely to lead to the establishment of a 
consolidated, durable democracy (1991, p. 282).  A revolution signals high popular 
dissatisfaction with the current political system while simultaneously implying that no 
mechanism exists for the lawful expression of that discontent.  When a transition occurs 
prior to the emergence of political institutions that can be effective transmitters of 
popular sentiment to the government, consolidated democracy becomes a more difficult 
achievement.  A communist regime may fall easily to a revolution, but such a transition 
suggests that the institutions necessary for negotiation and consensus building in a 
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democracy still do not exist.  The post-revolutionary environment thus is more likely to 
be filled by remnant communist organizations than by a mix of institutions representing 
the opposition because the latter institutions generally remain weak and fragmented 
throughout a revolution.  This was the case in the Romanian case study. 
As a correlating premise to the avoidance of a revolution, the promotion of a 
transition by imposition or reform should also guide the decisions of international policy 
makers.  Transitions through imposition and reform avoid the sudden power vacuum of a 
revolution and allow the gradual development of mass-based political institutions.  This 
slower process gives fledging institutions the opportunity to gain experience in 
developing the political skills necessary for effective representation in a controlled, 
peaceful environment.  Instead of being thrust into power unprepared, these institutions 
can slowly take on greater responsibility in the political system and are more likely to 
contribute to the consolidation of democracy once the transition is complete.  Moreover, 
a transition through imposition or reform lessens the probability that external institutions 
will intervene directly in the Cuban transition process. 
Overall, the first tenet policy makers should follow is that of avoiding a violent 
revolution in Cuba.  To do so, decision makers must promote a transition through 
imposition or reform.  This will encourage the political development of Cuba into a stable 
and consolidated member of the global democratic community. 
2. Promote an Independent Cuban Civil Society 
To avoid a revolution in Cuba and to support a transition towards democracy 
through imposition or reform, international decision makers need to promote an 
independent civil society on the island.  A vibrant civil society speeds the development 
and practice of the political skills of negotiating and consensus building needed in a 
democracy.  To accomplish this goal, policy makers should support a two-pronged effort 
that targets both civil society and the communist elites. 
 For civil society to grow in Cuba, it needs the support of external institutions.  
Because of the Cuban government’s current repression of these organizations, this 
funding depends on the generosity of external institutions.  External institutions should 
provide resources, including both financial ones and practical training and education, to 
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Cuba’s civil society actors with political potential.  However, guidelines must be 
established for determining the recipient institutions.  The international community 
should not support Cuba civil society organizations that are affiliated with the communist 
regime.  Instead, it should focus its efforts on expanding the popular base of independent 
institutions that promote, directly or indirectly, peaceful change towards democracy on 
the island.  In this way, external institutions will speed the development of the mass-
based institutions and skills crucial to creating a democracy in Cuba in the future. 
In addition to providing aid to Cuban civil society institutions, the international 
community should also pressure the communist regime to accept the growth of an 
independent civil society in Cuba.  Certainly, the communists that most likely would 
respond positively to such suggestions are the reformers.  Therefore, the international 
community needs to establish mechanisms for dialogue with this institution.  Moreover, 
international institutions should also build relationships with the Cuban security forces in 
an attempt to build support among these normally-repressive institutions for the growth 
of an independent Cuban civil society.  Thus, by seeking to influence the communist 
regime, external institutions may expand the political space needed for independent civil 
society institutions in Cuba. 
Ultimately, a peaceful, stable transition towards democracy in Cuba requires the 
emergence of an independent civil society.  Promoting this growth by working with both 
civil society and the communist regime, international actors can help Cuba to avoid a 
violent revolution while building the foundation for consolidated democracy on the 
island. 
3. Seek an International Consensus on Cuba’s Future 
To accomplish the aforementioned recommendations in an efficacious manner, 
the international community must seek a consensus on Cuba’s future.  The influence of 
external institutions in promoting change in Cuba will be heightened if they speak with 
one voice.  Certainly, not every external institution will support a single plan of action 
towards Cuba.  Nevertheless, the underpinnings of a consensus appear in the policies of 
most European and Latin American countries as well as those of the most prominent 
inter-governmental organizations.  Mirroring these institutions’ approaches to Cuba, an 
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international consensus needs to voice support for a peaceful transition to democracy on 
the island and develop a strategy for making this desire a reality. 
In general, the international community already agrees on Cuba’s need for 
democracy.  Most states, non-governmental organizations, and inter-governmental 
organizations support the democratization of Cuba regardless of the methods they use in 
pursuing that end.  Even the outlier states, such as China and Venezuela, do not dispute 
the right of self-determination for Cubans even if they do not think democracy would be 
the desired outcome.  Therefore, agreeing that Cuba should become an integral member 
of the democratic community comes as the easiest step in reaching an international 
consensus on the island’s future. 
Reaching an agreement on the best way to promote democratization is the more 
difficult challenge for the international community.  The debate over the United States’ 
embargo of Cuba demonstrates the current divergence in opinions.  Even though the 
United States needs to be involved in shaping Cuba’s future due to its inevitable 
interaction with a post-authoritarian Cuba, its unilateral policies towards Cuba greatly 
hinder an international consensus on the island’s future.  Eliminating the embargo would 
greatly enhance the bargaining power of the international community and make an 
international consensus possible.  Normalizing trade relations with Cuba would unlink 
basic economic issues from political ones and, according to Cuba’s communists, provide 
the necessary step for dialogue on Cuba’s political future.  Although additional aid to 
Cuba could be effectively conditioned on political changes on the island, negotiating on a 
foundation of mutual respect with multilateral agreement will be the most effective way 
the international community can promote their desired changes in Cuba. 
In short, an international consensus on Cuba’s future will aid external institutions 
in avoiding a revolution in Cuba, supporting peaceful democratization on the island, and 
promoting the growth of an independent Cuban civil society.  Ultimately, the three tenets 
this work proposes to guide international policy decisions on Cuba are mutually 
reinforcing and hold the greatest promise for increasing the ability of external institutions 
to positively influence Cuba’s political future. 
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B. THE IMPERATIVE OF CONTINUED RESEARCH 
 Due to the dynamic interaction of political institutions, continued research is an 
imperative for an accurate assessment of Cuba’s next transition.  Just as political 
institutions shape the political environment in any given country, political environments 
also shape institutions.  As institutions change, so may the implications for Cuba’s next 
transition.  Thus, the study of Cuba’s institutional environment needs to be an ongoing 
effort in order accurately assess Cuba’s next mode of transition and provide decision 
makers with relevant information on Cuba’s future. 
The case studies explored in this work demonstrate the imperative of continued 
research.  For example, the most crucial events in the Romanian and Bulgarian transitions 
towards democracy occurred in the years of 1989 and 1990.  Radical changes in 
institutional landscapes and important shifts in institutional strengths characterized these 
two years.  Certainly, an assessment of these countries’ political institutions during the 
mid-1980s would not have suggested that such fundamental transformation of these 
states’ political systems was so close at hand.  Consequently, one cannot assume that an 
analysis of Cuba’s institutional environment performed today will be valid indefinitely.  
Therefore, research on and analysis of the institutions affecting Cuba’s political 
environment should be an ongoing process. 
Ultimately, up-to-date research on Cuba’s institutional environment supplemented 
by comparisons with the transitions in the Soviet bloc countries can help predict what 
type of transitions Cuba will experience in the future and can aid decision makers in 
formulating effective policy that will promote a stable, peaceful transition to consolidated 
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